

**Annex 4. Assessment report on Water Supply,  
Sanitation, Hygiene and Insolation infrastructure,  
facilities and equipment present at Moldovan Border  
Crossing Points in the context of COVID-19 outbreak**

**ASSESSMENT REPORT**  
**on Water Supply, Sanitation, Hygiene and Insolation infrastructure, facilities and**  
**equipment present at Moldovan Border Crossing Points**  
**in the context of COVID-19 outbreak**



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**List of abbreviations**

BCP	Border Crossing Point
BP	Border Police
GD	Government Decision
GIBP	General Inspectorate of Border Police
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRH	International Health Regulations
NPHA	National Public Health Agency
WASH	Water Supply, Sanitation, and Hygiene Promotion
WHO	World Health Organization

## **1. Context**

### **1.1. Introduction**

The evolving of the Coronavirus infectious disease (COVID – 19) outbreak worldwide, resulting in its declaration as pandemic on the 11<sup>th</sup> of March by the World Health Organization (WHO), has taken its toll on the Republic of Moldova, as well. The curb of infections in Moldova has been, generally, on the rise since the first case was registered in the country on the 7<sup>th</sup> of March, following the return of a Moldovan migrant from a country heavily affected by the pandemic. As a result, on the 17<sup>th</sup> of March the Moldovan Parliament declared state of national emergency on the whole territory of the country for a 60- day period and on the 16<sup>th</sup> of May public health emergency has been declared.

The border crossing personnel are among the frontline staff that are at risk of getting infected with the COVID – 19 infectious disease. Thus, currently 70 Border Police officers<sup>1</sup> have been infected with the novel Coronavirus. Although, currently the cause of infection is mainly community-based, during the March – April months, the main cause of infection was from the travellers entering the country.

According to the WHO International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005), which Moldova has integrated into its legislation in 2008, the BCPs can play a key role in preventing the spread of the disease into the country through: containing the risk at source, responding to the public health emergencies generated by the infectious diseases and through the implementation of public health recommendations, while limiting unnecessary health – based restrictions on international traffic and trade.

In this context, the assessment seeks to evaluate the infrastructural and equipment related needs of 12 (twelve) BCPs, with the highest flow of border crossings, to support the Moldovan Border Police (BP) mission to efficiently respond to the public health risks related to the spread of the COVID – 19 infection into the country. More specifically, this refers to the BP activities intended to ensure, on the one hand, the efficient infection control and management at the BCPs, and, on the other hand, to protect its border crossing personnel from getting infected, while being the first line of defence for the efficient containment of the virus at the entry into the country.

The 12 (twelve) target BCPs (air, railway, river and road border crossings) have been chosen by the BP also having in mind the need to potentially update the current Government Decision no 531 of 3.07.2014 on the implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005) in view of preventing cross-border transmission of public health hazards, which designated, in compliance with IHR, only 6 (six) BCPs that should maintain core capacities for emergency preparedness, response and surveillance during public health emergencies (*see Table 3*). However, the protracted COVID – 19 pandemic, the first of such proportions faced by Moldova and the whole world in the recent history, proved that maintaining core capacities at a limited number of BCPs creates challenges for a secure movement of persons and goods across borders and proper protection of both travellers and border crossing staff, and consequently for an effective border management.

In this respect, the recommendations of this assessment target the procurement of the stringently needed equipment for carrying out the BP's competencies to detect, handle and isolate the suspected cases of contamination with COVID – 19 at the selected BCPs. The assessment also aims at providing recommendations on procurement of the necessary WASH (Water Supply, Sanitation, and Hygiene Promotion) and waste management infrastructure, equipment and supplies, as well as for equipping the triage and isolation facilities available at the BCPs or finding alternative solutions, in case of absence of such facilities. All the provided recommendations intend to help the efficient implementation of the health and sanitary measures and maintaining response and surveillance capacities at the BCPs, in compliance with the WHO recommendations.

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<sup>1</sup> Moldovan Border Police data, as of 14 July 2020.

The modernization of infrastructure and equipment endowment of the BCPs in line with their ongoing operational needs, is also among the priorities and actions established in the National Strategy on Integrated Border Management for 2018 – 2023 and the Action Plan for its implementation for the period 2018 – 2020, approved by the Government Decision no 1101 of 14.11.2018 and in the General Inspectorate of Border Police (GIBP)'s Action Plan for 2020, intended for strengthening the capacities for an effective border management. More specifically, the Action Plan for the implementation of the National Strategy on Integrated Border Management provides for upgrading the infrastructure of Sculeni – Sculeni, Leușeni – Albița and Giurgiulești-Galați BCPs, which is to be funded by the European Union, under 2014 – 2020 Romania – Republic of Moldova Joint Operational Programme, through the European Neighbourhood Instrument. The Strategy also provides for building minimum capacities of public health surveillance at the BCPs. These activities are intended to ultimately contribute to preventing any threat to the national security, public order and public health, while also facilitating the smooth cross-border mobility of persons and goods and ensuring the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in line with the principles of integrated border management. Although the latter BCP planned upgrading activities are not directly related to the objectives of this needs' assessment, nor are under the primary responsibility of the BP, but rather of the Customs Service, the assessment's conclusions and recommendations could be taken into consideration during the construction and/or reparation processes.

## **1.2. Objectives**

The current needs assessment is carried out under the *“Strengthening the Republic of Moldova's National Response to the COVID-19 Crisis”* Project.

The project aims to address the urgent needs of the Government of the Republic of Moldova to reinforce its health emergency preparedness and response capacity in the wake of the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak. Although it addresses the needs of several categories of frontline personnel in the health system and non-health agencies, one of the project's specific objectives is to also enhance the capacities of the Border Police to ensure efficient infection control and management at the BCPs.

Therefore, the assessment aims to contribute to strengthening the BP capabilities to carry out its integrated border management competencies related to responding to the public health emergency, of international concern, generated by the COVID – 19 outbreak, i.e. to detect, manage and isolate the ill travellers with suspected COVID – 19 infection that arrive at the BCP, in order to prevent further domestic and international spread. It is important to mention that these competencies are carried out in cooperation and coordination with other relevant national health authorities, as well as services operating at the BCPs, in accordance with the legislation in force. Thus, the specific objectives of the assessment are to:

- assess the needs and gaps in WASH (Water Supply, Sanitation, and Hygiene Promotion) and isolation infrastructure, facilities and equipment and waste management equipment, needed for the implementation of the sanitary and health measures required for COVID – 19 virus; and provide suggestions for upgrading them and for the procurement of additionally needed equipment, intended to protect both the border crossing personnel and the population from infection;
- assess the needs of equipment for carrying out effective entry and exit epidemiological screening of travellers arriving at the BCP, and thus prevent further domestic and international spread of the infectious disease.

The conclusions and suggestions drawn as a result of this needs assessment take into consideration the WHO and IOM recommendations for sanitary and health measures and core response and infection surveillance capacities that need to be maintained at the BCPs (airports, ports, railway and road border crossings). More specifically, these are laid down in the WHO IHR (2005) and recent guidelines on managing the ill travellers at points of entry and water, sanitation, hygiene, waste management for COVID – 19 virus, and in the IOM recommendations for Standard Operating Procedures for frontline border officials at points of entry in

response to COVID – 19 outbreak. Additionally, the assessment took into consideration the findings of the Joint External Evaluation of Moldova's IHR core capacities, conducted in 2018.

The proposed suggestions are intended to help IOM Mission to Moldova to identify and prioritize the capacity needs that it could support under the current of future projects, the direct beneficiary of which is the Moldovan Border Police.

It is also important to mention that the Moldovan legislation<sup>2</sup> foresees the implementation of control (monitoring, rapid notification, mitigation) and maintaining of core capacities to prevent cross-border transmission and respond to the following public health emergencies: biological hazards (including new and already known and expected infectious diseases or biological toxins not related to communicable diseases), chemical and radiological hazards, environmental hazards, hazards of unknown sources and any other public health events, declared by WHO as being of international concern. Thus, this assessment intends to assess the infrastructural and equipment needs, aimed at strengthening core capacities for response to communicable diseases, of international concern (i.e. pandemics) and infection control at BCPs only, with particular focus on the public health emergency, related to the spread of COVID – 19 outbreak.

It is also noteworthy to mention the limitations of this assessment's conclusions and recommendations. More specifically, the implementation of some of the suggestions related to upgrading the BCP infrastructure might be limited by external factors, which are not under the control of IOM project or BP. Although the Border Police has the primary role in detecting, notifying and isolating the sick travellers with suspected COVID – 19 infection at BCPs, Customs Service, under the Ministry of Finance is the actual legal owner of the BCP infrastructure, in the case of road BCPs, the state company "Giurgiulești International Free Port" administers the BCP premises in Giurgiulești International Free Port, "Avia Invest LTD" company administers the premises of the Chișinău International Airport, under the concession agreement with the Government of the Republic of Moldova and the State Enterprise "Moldovan Railways" is the legal owner of the infrastructure of the Ungheni – Iași BCP, hosted by the Ungheni railway station. However, in the context of the Government's response to the COVID – 19 outbreak, these entities have provided the BP, upon request, and depending on the available infrastructure, with the necessary facilities intended for the epidemiological triage of all travellers arriving at BCP and for the isolation of ill travellers.

### **1.3. Methodology**

The needs assessment involved systematic gathering and analysing of information relating to the existent gaps and needs in WASH and isolation infrastructure and facilities, and response capacities of the 12 (twelve) target BCPs to prevent cross-border transmission of COVID – 19 infection, and also having in mind other future potential infectious diseases with high risk for public health.

The needs assessment was conducted with the involvement of the relevant personnel of the GIBP and of the institution's Regional Directorates, as follows:

- Border Control and Surveillance General Directorate;
- Medical Centre of the GIBP;
- 12 (twelve) Target Border Crossing Points.

The following quantitative and qualitative research methods have been employed:

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<sup>2</sup> Government Decision 531 of 3.07.2014 on the implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005) in view of preventing cross-border transmission of public health hazards; GD no. 1431/2016 on approving the Regulation on early warning and response system for prevention and control of communicable diseases and public health events.

- Checklist, submitted for completion to the target BCPs, which have the highest flow of border crossings, intended to assess the infrastructure and equipment available for carrying out the BP's infection control activities at BCPs (see Table 1 for the list of BCPs). The checklist was developed based on WHO IHR (2005), IOM and WHO's latest guidelines<sup>3</sup> on recommended actions to be taken in response to COVID – 19 outbreak, as well as on the Sphere WASH minimum standards in humanitarian response<sup>4</sup> (see Annex 1 for the checklist), and also took into consideration the WHO Joint External Evaluation tool for monitoring and evaluation of the implementation by the Member States of the IHR recommendations.
- Checklist, submitted for completion to the GIPF, for a broader overview of the researched aspects.
- Semi – structured interviews, conducted during the visits at the BCPs and on the phone with:
  - a. The management personnel of the Border Police Sectors, to which the 12 (twelve) target BCPs are subordinated;
  - b. Chief doctor of the Medical Centre of the GIBP;
  - c. The management personnel of the Border Control and Surveillance General Directorate.
- Analysis of the relevant national legislative and normative framework, as well as of the institutional level normative acts;
- Analysis of all the IOM and WHO's latest guidelines and recommendations, i.e.: WHO guidelines on the management of ill travellers at BCPs (international airports, ports and ground crossings) in the context of COVID – 19 outbreak, and on water, sanitation, hygiene and waste management for the COVID-19 virus, WHO IHR (2005), and other relevant guidelines, IOM recommendations for Standard Operating Procedures for frontline border officials at points of entry in response to COVID – 19 outbreak, as well as other third party studies, recommendations and best practices.
- Personal observation during the visits at the BCPs, that took place between 3-12 June 2020.

No	Border Crossing Point	January	February	March	April	May	June
1.	Leușeni-Albița, Road, international	296.414	210.589	110.924	24.013	46.683	74.493
2.	Chișinău Airport, Air, international	217.497	181.916	87.038	8.461	10.242	23.934
3.	Sculeni-Sculeni, Road, international	182.083	160.758	84.686	6.709	8.042	18.523
4.	Otaci-Moghilev-Podolsk, road, international	130.144	122.115	68.228	10.620	14.547	13.704
5.	Giurgiulești-Galați, Road, international	117.195	104.926	63.259	4.656	11.514	40.015

<sup>3</sup> WHO Interim Guidance, *Management of ill travelers at Points of Entry (international airports, seaports and ground crossings) in the context of COVID – 19*, 19 March 2020; WHO Interim Guidance, *Water, sanitation, hygiene, and waste management for the COVID – 19 virus*, 23 April 2020; IOM *Standard Operating Procedures for Front-line Border Officials at the Point of Entry in Response to COVID – 19 outbreak*.

<sup>4</sup> Sphere Association. *The Sphere Handbook: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response*, fourth edition, Geneva, Switzerland, 2018. [www.spherestandards.org/handbook](http://www.spherestandards.org/handbook); *Joint external evaluation tool: International Health Regulations* (2005), second edition. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2018. Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO.



6.	Criva-Mamaliga, road, international	88.043	70.183	27.842	1.159	0	4.835
7.	Cahul-Oancea, Road, international	79.666	62.428	26.837	0	0	0
8.	Palanca-Maiaki – Udobnoe, road, international	56.494	54.530	32.265	3.516	1.014	3.152
9.	Giurgiulești-Reni, Road, international	34.066	26.113	16.891	5.108	4.309	7.112
10.	Tudora-Starokazacie, Road, international	24.803	21.831	17.212	7.793	11.356	9.865
11.	Ungheni – Iași, railway, international	9.062	8.203	4.084	182	302	296
12.	Giurgiulesti International Free Port, river, international	192	381	294	212	117	142
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1.226.405</b>	<b>1.015.389</b>	<b>535.182</b>	<b>72.035</b>	<b>107.707</b>	<b>195.633</b>

**Table 1.** Target Border Crossing Points, with the highest flow of borders crossings, January – June, 2020.

Being the BCPs with the highest flow of travellers, it is at these BCPs that most travellers with suspected COVID – 19 infection have been detected (*see Table 2*).

No	Border Crossing Point	No of cases
1.	Chișinău Airport, air, international	4
2.	Cahul-Oancea, road, international	-
3.	Criva-Mamaliga, road, international	-
4.	Giurgiulești-Galați, road, international	-
5.	Leușeni-Albița, road, international	1
6.	Otaci-Moghilev-Podolsk, road, international	-
7.	Palanca-Maiaki – Udobnoe, road, international	-
8.	Giurgiulești-Reni, road, international	-
9.	Sculeni-Sculeni, Road, international	2
10.	Tudora-Starokazacie, road, international	-
11.	Ungheni – Iași, railway, international	1
12.	Giurgiulești International Free Port, river, international	-
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>8</b>

**Table 2.** Border Crossing Points with detected travellers with suspected COVID – 19 infection, February – June 2020.

The solutions regarding the equipment and infrastructure recommended for the BCPs in order to strengthen their capabilities to efficiently prevent and respond to the public health risk related to the cross-border transmission of COVID-19 infection and of other potential infectious diseases, have taken into consideration the following aspects:

- The flow of borders crossings at each BCP;
- The currently available equipment, infrastructure and facilities at BCPs and the capacity of the BCP infrastructure to accommodate other installations, as needed;
- The list of designated BCPs that should maintain core response and surveillance capacities during public health emergencies, in line with the Government Decision 531 of 3.07.2014 on the implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005) in view of preventing cross-border transmission of public health hazards;

- IOM, WHO and other third party recommendations and best practices;
- Consultations with the GIBP management and healthcare personnel.

## 2. The legal and regulatory framework regarding Border Police competencies in the field of prevention of cross-border transmission of infectious diseases

The GIBP is the central public administration body under the subordination of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that has mission and duties related to the implementation of the state policy in the field of Integrated State Border Management. To carry out these mission and duties the institution works to facilitate the legal mobility of persons, means of transportation and goods, while also ensuring efficient surveillance and control of border crossings, as well as countering of irregular migration and cross-border crime.

In the field of prevention and response to the risk of cross-border transmission of public health risks of international concern, a series of legislative and normative acts have been adopted. More specifically, the *Law no 283 of 28.12.2011 on the Border Police*, art. 6 g) lays down the Border Police competencies in the field of prevention and control of public health risks and hazards, in line with the WHO IHR (2005). The *Law no 215 of 04.11.2011 on the state border of the Republic of Moldova*, art. 11, p.6 also provides that in the event of the risk of cross-border transmission of infectious diseases that could jeopardize the health and life of the population, both the Border Police and the Customs Service are allowed to temporarily suspend or limit the cross-border mobility and, at the same time, establish a quarantine regime for persons, animals and goods, while notifying all the relevant national authorities, as well as neighbouring countries. The *Government Decision (GD) no 1145 of 21.11.2018 on the organization and functioning of the GIBP*, art. 7, p. f) also obliges the institution to implement, in cooperation with other relevant authorities, health and sanitary measures, in compliance with the WHO IHR (2005), gives it the responsibility to decide upon the cases in which it may refuse the entry on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, based on public health or epidemiological reasons, and to implement other measures to mitigate the risk of the spread of an epidemic.

Consequently, according to the *Government Decision no 531 of 03.07.2014 on the implementation of the IHR (2005)*, the BP and the Customs Service, in cooperation with other relevant authorities<sup>5</sup> must ensure the implementation of the following infection control and response activities at BCPs:

- Monitoring the situation at BCPs and early warning on the emerging cross-border public health risks;
- Detection of suspected ill travellers;
- Ensuring prompt notification on the public health risks that could spread across borders;
- Implementing public health measures and response activities, as well as maintain relevant response capacities at designated BCPs (airport, port and railway and road border crossings), in order to prevent cross-border transmission of public health risks of international concern, on the whole territory of the country.

The *Government Decision no 531 of 3.07.2014* also lays down the list of BCPs, with international status, and representing all types of BCPs (air, road, railway, river) that should maintain core response and surveillance capacities during public health emergencies, in compliance with the IHR (see Table 3).

No	Border Crossing Point	Type of Border Crossing Point
1.	Chişinău International Airport	Air

<sup>5</sup> The names and structures of the specific national public authorities mentioned in the Government Decision no 531 of 03.07.2014, do not correspond to their current names and structures, following the central public administration reform. The current names of the other national public authorities, agencies and companies with a role in public health surveillance during public health emergencies, envisaged by the GD are: the Ministry of Health, Labour and Social Protection, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Economy and Infrastructure, the Ministry of Agriculture, Regional Development and Environment, the Civil Aeronautic Authority, the National Agency for Food Security and the Administration of Giurgiuleşti International Free Port.

2.	Leușeni-Albița, international	Road
3.	Criva-Mamaliga <sup>6</sup> , international	
4.	Tudora-Starokazacie, international	
5.	Ungheni- Iași, international	Railway
6.	Giurgiulești International Free Port, international	River

**Table 3.** Designated BCPs that should maintain core response and surveillance capacities, according to the Government Decision 531 of 3.07.2014.

The Government Decision also provides for development of minimum response capacities at other BCPs, with international status, in compliance with the IHR (2005) provisions. Therefore, the Border Police is striving to establish core response and infection control capacities at a more extended list of BCPs (see *Table 4*), for the following reasons:

- The highest flow of travellers, characteristic for these BCPs, out of the 35 BCPs with international status, that are under the control of the authorities of the Republic of Moldova (see *Table 1*); and the need to ensure the conditions for continuous and safe movement of persons and goods, and effective border management, in the context of a protracted COVID – 19 pandemic;
- Some of the BCPs that are not included in the Government Decision, are crucial for the international transit of travellers, i.e. the following transiting corridors: Giurgiulești – Galați, road - Giurgiulești – Reni, road; Palanca – Maiaki – Udobnoe, road - Chișinău International Airport, air;
- The need to update the Government Decision no 531 of 3.07.2014, due to unforeseen changes in the running of designated BCPs, causing the opening of some BCPs that are not included in the Government Decision and closing of others that have been included in the Government Decision, upon ad-hoc agreements and requests from the Romanian or the Ukrainian Government. Currently, all the BCPs targeted by this assessment are kept open and running except for the Cahul-Oancea BCP that has been closed, upon the request of the Romanian Government. At the same time, during April-May, Criva - Mămăliga BCP, with international status, although it was designated through Government Decision to maintain core capacities during public health emergencies, it was closed upon the request of the Ukrainian Border Guard Service. Instead, following bilateral discussions Otaci-Moghilev-Podolsk road BCP, with international status, has been opened. The BCP is situated in Otaci town, therefore nearby community and does not have the necessary equipment and infrastructure to allow it to efficiently respond to public health emergencies.

No	Border Crossing Point	Type of Border Crossing Point
1.	Chișinău International Airport	Air
2.	Leușeni-Albița, international	Road
3.	Sculeni-Sculeni, international	
4.	Giurgiulești-Galați, international	
5.	Criva-Mamaliga, international <sup>7</sup>	
6.	Cahul-Oancea, international <sup>8</sup>	
7.	Otaci-Moghilev-Podolsk, international	

<sup>6</sup> Criva-Mamaliga road BCP, with international status, although it was designated in the Government Decision, was closed upon the request of the Ukrainian Border Guard Service. Instead, following bilateral discussions, Otaci-Moghilev-Podolsk road BCP, with international status has been opened.

<sup>7</sup> Criva-Mamaliga road BCP, with international status, although it was designated in the Government Decision, has been closed upon the request of the Ukrainian Border Guard Service, until 15 June. Instead, following bilateral discussions, Otaci-Moghilev-Podolsk road BCP, with international status has been opened.

<sup>8</sup> Cahul-Oancea road BCP, with international status, has been closed upon the request of the Romanian General Inspectorate of Border Police.

8.	Giurgiulești-Reni, international	
9.	Tudora-Starokazacie, international	
10.	Palanca-Maiaki – Udobnoe, international	
11.	Ungheni- Iași, international (only for commercial purposes)	Railway
12.	Giurgiulești International Free Port, international (only for commercial purposes)	River

**Table 4.** The BCPs, the core response and surveillance capacities of which the BP strives to build.

According to the *Government Decision no 475 of 26.03.2008 on approving the action plan on implementing the International Health Regulations (2005)*, in order to successfully carry out the above-mentioned competencies, some of the most important measures that should be taken to mitigate public health hazards linked to the spread of infectious diseases, including by the Border Police, are the following:

- Designating airports, ports and ground crossings (road and railway) that should develop and maintain core response and surveillance capacities, in compliance with the IHR (2005)<sup>9</sup>;
- Evaluation of institution's capacities and existent national resources in order to ensure minimum standards for surveillance and response to public health risks;
- Developing and implementing action plans on development, strengthening and maintaining core capacities for detection, prompt and efficient response to public health risks and emergencies, in cooperation with other national authorities; as well as related national, territorial and institutional intervention plans;
- Updating the early warning and response system in order to prevent cross-border transmission of public health hazards;
- Developing and implementing a notification system on public health risks that can spread on the territory of the country;
- Equipping the BCPs with the necessary equipment for detection of the travellers with fever;
- Maintaining access to a clean environment for travellers at BCPs, including to public toilets, technical and drinking water, food establishments, as well as waste management installations;
- Ensuring permanent access to medical personnel and services at BCPs, including to appropriate diagnosis equipment and facilities for rapid medical examination; ensuring access at BCPs to medical equipment and personnel for the transportation of ill travellers to professional medical facilities; and ensuring proper diagnosis and medical care of travellers, as a result of signing agreements with local medical services;
- Adjusting the internal regulations and job descriptions, and organize training for the personnel, in order to fulfil duties, in compliance with the IHR; develop programs and guidelines on training the personnel of the authorities involved in the implementation of the IHR;
- Ensuring separate spaces for interviewing, examination or quarantining of suspected cases;
- Continuous implementation of vector control programs at BCPs;
- Providing the responsible authorities present at BCPs with personal protective equipment (PPE) and means for the implementation of the recommended health and sanitary measures.

The *National Strategy on Integrated Border Management*, approved by the *Government Decision no. 1101 of 14.11.2018*, has also set as one of its priorities the equipping of BCPs with minimum capacities for public health surveillance, in compliance with the IHR provisions. The Action Plan for the implementation of the National Strategy on Integrated Border Management also provides for the evaluation of the implementation of the *Government Decision no 475 of 26.03.2008*, and, respectively, of the IHR recommendations. In this

<sup>9</sup> The Government Decision includes the following other national public authorities, agencies and companies with a role in building core surveillance and response capacities (including related to the available infrastructure): Customs Services, State Administration of Civil Aviation, now restructured the in Civil Aeronautic Authority, Ministry of Transportation and Roads currently integrated into the Ministry of Economy and Infrastructure etc. The names and structures of the specific national public authorities mentioned in the Government Decision no 531 of 03.07.2014, do not correspond to their current names and structures, following the central public administration reform.

sense, a Joint External Evaluation of Moldova's IHR core capacities have been conducted by the WHO in 2018. Among its main recommendations was the need to equip designated BCPs with the necessary equipment for detection and responding to public health emergencies, as well as make available or fully equipped and functional isolation facilities at the BCPs.

The national notification and early warning and rapid response system on prevention and control of communicable disease and public health events set up by the Government of the Republic of Moldova includes also the Border Police and Customs Service, along with other relevant national authorities, following the approval of the *Government Decision No 429 of 07.07.2015 on the approval of the Regulation on the Border Security Coordination System* and of the *Government Decision no 1431 of 29.12.2016 on the approval of the Regulation on early warning and rapid alert system for the prevention, control of communicable diseases and public health events*.

Also, the GIBP, the National Agency for Public Health (NAPH), the National Pre-hospital Emergency Medical Assistance Centre and the Customs Service have jointly developed, in 2014, and are implementing standard operating procedures for preventing the cross-border transmission of public health hazards and establishing monitoring, detection, notification, as well as response mechanisms to public health emergencies, including pandemics at BCPs and the responsibilities of all relevant institutions. According to these procedures, the National Pre-hospital Emergency Medical Assistance Centre and the Customs Service is notified with regards to the public health events occurring at BCPs, in order to allow for the access of local emergency medical assistance services for examination, establishing diagnosis of ill travellers detected at BCPs and their transportation to medical care facilities. Additionally, a National Plan on preparedness and intervention in public health emergencies at BCPs was also signed by the GIBP and NAPH in 2018, laying out joint activities intended for early identification and notification on public health emergencies arising at BCPs, prevention of related risks and improving emergency preparedness of BCPs through training provided by the public health surveillance and emergency medical care authorities. Thus, the BP was integrated to into the IHR's National Communication System through its Coordination Operational Centre.

### **3. Assessment of the equipment and infrastructure available and needed at BCPs and related suggestions**

Republic of Moldova incorporated the provisions of the International Health Regulations (2005) in its legislation, by adopting the above-mentioned *Government Decisions 475 of 26.03.2008 and no 531 of 03.07.2014*. In compliance with the Regulation, the Government is requested to: (1) *maintain core public health response capacities at designated BCPs* (airports, ports, railway and road crossings), and subsequently (2) *develop minimum surveillance and response capacities at the other BCPs*.

These are intended to protect the health of frontline workers, i.e. the staff of the BCPs, on the one hand, and the health of travellers and the population, on the other hand, while at the same time keeping the ports, airports and ground (railway and road) crossings running, and ensuring that these are in good sanitary condition, so that no unnecessary public health-based restrictions are placed on international traffic and trade.

#### **3.1 Procedures**

##### *Entry and exit screening and detection of ill travellers*

In this respect, in the wake of the COVID – 19 global pandemic outbreak, the Moldovan Border Police updated its regulations and procedures, including a SOP for combating the transmission of COVID – 19 pandemic at

BCPs, recently developed in compliance with the IHR, as well as WHO<sup>10</sup> and IOM<sup>11</sup> latest guidelines and recommendations, in order to reorganize the border control procedure, so as to include the following operations:

- entry and exit screening of travellers;
- notification on the public health events of concern to the relevant national institutions;
- isolation and management of ill travellers;
- disinfection of the BCP spaces and maintaining workplace and personal hygiene;
- safe disposal and management of waste from used PPEs and from a case or suspected case of contamination.

The entry and exit screening of travellers is done before carrying out the border control procedure. The entry screening procedure includes: the interviewing of the traveller, based on the epidemiological fiche that is necessary to be filled latter in order to collect more data on the traveller, the temperature measurement and visual observation carried out by the border police officer; or self-reporting by travellers.

The exit screening includes the same steps, except for the obligation for the travellers that exit the country to fill in the epidemiological fiche.

Thus, the entry and exit screening of travellers aims at:

- Detecting the travellers that manifest signs and symptoms of COVID – 19 infection;
- Besides checking the validity of the travel documents, also verifying, on the entry direction, the validity of all the additional information included in the epidemiological fiche (e.g. countries visited prior to arrival, address in the country, telephone number, etc.);
- Checking, on the exit direction, whether the traveller has stayed for at least 14 days in the country. In the event that the traveller has not stayed for a period of 14 days in the country, a nominal alert is issued by the Integrated Border Management Information System, and, as a result, the traveller is not authorized to leave the country, at the same time, being subject to the related contravention liability;
- Educating the travellers on the public health risk of international concern, and, consequently, on the new border crossing regime rules established for travellers and vehicles, through oral communication and distribution of information materials, available at the BCPs in Russian, Romanian and English. The information materials also warn on: the obligation to respect a 14 - day self-isolation regime, upon the entry into the country, following the decisions of the Moldovan Commission for Emergency Situations; the contravention and criminal liability established for not abiding by the new rules.

### **Best Practices**

According to a recent study by the European Centre for Control Disease (ECCD)<sup>12</sup>, although the exit and entry screening processes at BCPs are recommended by WHO, this strategy alone is not enough for infection control at BCPs, specifically for COVID – 19 virus, given that asymptomatic (or pre-symptomatic and mild) cases play a significant role in the transmission of COVID-19. According to ECCD, the most efficient strategies to ensure infection control during entry and exit screening procedures at BCPs are:

<sup>10</sup> WHO Interim Guidance, *Management of ill travelers at Points of Entry (international airports, seaports and ground crossings) in the context of COVID – 19*, 19 March 2020; WHO Interim Guidance, *Water, sanitation, hygiene, and waste management for the COVID – 19 virus*, 23 April 2020.

<sup>11</sup> IOM *Standard Operating Procedures for Front-line Border Officials at the Point of Entry in Response to COVID – 19 outbreak*.

<sup>12</sup> ECCD. *Consideration on passenger locator data, entry and exit screening and health declarations in the context of COVID-19 in the EU/EEA and the UK*, 12 June 2020; Varvara Mouchtouri et al. *Exit and Entry Screening Practices for Infectious Diseases among Travelers at Points of Entry: Looking for Evidence on Public Health Impact*. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 21 November 2019.

passenger locator data, particularly for airline passengers (that for a quicker action should be provided by the airline companies to the health authorities), together with contact tracing activities for communicable diseases, testing, intensive risk communication on the importance of personal protective measures, application of physical distancing, as well as hand and respiratory hygiene measures.

However, according to ECCD, the main advantages of entry/exit screening are: stopping ill travellers from travelling, enhancing travellers' confidence during the journey, and the opportunity to inform the travellers on the infectious disease, its risks and actions that could be taken to mitigate them.

However, entry/exit screening can be even more beneficial in case of detecting other potential diseases, that involve infection transmission at the onset of symptoms, such as Ebola Virus Disease.

Countries have used entry/exit screening at BCPs for surveillance of various infectious diseases, including China, Taiwan for COVID - 19, Singapore, UK, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Peru, Japan, Australia for other infectious diseases and UK and West African countries for Ebola.

*Therefore, besides entry/exit screening procedures, it is recommended to also carry out testing of travellers upon entry into the country, intensive risk communication related to COVID – 19 infection and the necessary protective measures, including reminders of maintaining physical distancing and active contact tracing together with the collection of passenger locator data.*

#### *Notification of ill travellers*

Once a suspected case has been detected, in accordance with the COVID -19 case definitions, laid out in the the BP SOP (as per WHO recommendations<sup>13</sup>), the following operations are immediately carried out to notify on the public health event:

- Notification of the ill traveller, its family and travel companions on the actions that should be undertaken, to provide the necessary medical assistance to the patient and avoid further transmission of the infection;
- Notification on the public health risk of the 112 unified national service, the other authorities present at the BCP, as well as, via the BP operational coordination units, the BP management and other relevant national authorities i.e. the NPHA;
- Introducing the details of the suspected case into the paper-based *Registry of travellers suspected of COVID – 19 infection, detected at the BCP* (e.g. age, nationality, country of departure etc.);
- Providing access for the emergency medical care service on the BCP premises, to ensure the prompt assessment and care of the ill traveller, as well as his/her transportation to an appropriate medical facility.

#### *Isolation of ill travellers*

Simultaneously, immediately after detecting the suspected case, the ill traveller is isolated in a specially designated space, dedicated for sick travellers. The following operations are carried out in order to isolate the ill traveller and its contacts, in accordance with the definition of contact, laid out in the BP SOP (as per WHO recommendations):

- Isolating the ill traveller in a specially dedicated isolation room/space set up in the BCP, until he/she is picked up by the called medical care service and is brought to a nearby medical facility, while ensuring that he/she wears a protective mask;

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<sup>13</sup> World Health Organization. *Global Surveillance for COVID-19 caused by human infection with COVID – 19 virus, Interim guidance, 20 March 2020.*

- Isolating the vehicle and its passengers in a specially dedicated quarantine area, established at the BCP, to allow for additional assessment of the ill travellers' contacts, if needed;
- Providing access to and managing of the suspected case only while wearing a complete PPE (long – sleeved gown, protective mask and gloves, protective shield or goggles);
- Immediate disinfection of the isolation room, after the transmission of the suspected case in the care of the medical staff.

#### *Disinfection of the BCP spaces and maintaining workplace and personal hygiene*

As mentioned above, although the Border Police has the primary role in detecting, notifying and isolating the sick travellers with suspected COVID – 19 infection at BCPs, the owners or administrators of the BCP buildings and premises, have overall control over maintaining a clean environment for the border crossing personnel and travellers in the BCPs, in line with the sanitary measures recommended by WHO. These are the Customs Service, under the Ministry of Finance, in the case of road BCPs, the state company “Giurgiulești International Free Port”, in the case of Giurgiulești International Free Port, “Avia Invest LTD” company, in the case of Chișinău International Airport and the State Enterprise “Moldovan Railways” in the case of the railway BCPs.

However, the BP instructions and the newly developed SOP also lay out procedures for maintaining workplace and personal hygiene that are applicable at the BCPs and are aimed at sanitizing the working and public places in the BCPs. These include the following operations:

- Sanitizing working spaces (border control booths and other offices, including furniture, handles, phones etc.) and border control equipment (workstation, magnifiers, passport readers, UV lamps etc.), at least 3 times a day, including before starting the shift and after leaving the shift with alcohol - based solutions, as well as on ad-hoc basis, following interaction with persons suspected of having the infectious disease;
- Air purification in the dedicated epidemiological screening areas and isolation rooms/spaces, set up in the BCPs, with both disinfecting/biocidal solutions (0.5% sodium hypochlorite solution) and UV-C lamps<sup>14</sup>. Although air purification procedure, with UV-C lamps, was included in the most recent SOP, at the time of conducting the needs assessment, the BP was not in possession of such lamps.
- Frequent ventilation of working spaces;
- Frequent sanitizing of hands during and outside working hours, with soap or alcohol-based solutions available at the BCPs and inviting travellers to use them as well.

#### *Waste Management*

In accordance with the BP instructions, in order to prevent the contamination of the border police officers with the infectious disease, all the PPE (long – sleeved gown, mask, gloves, face shield or goggles) must be disposed in special biohazardous waste containers. The disposal of the biohazardous waste includes the following operations:

- Immediate safe disposal of the PPE after being in contact with and managing a suspected case of COVID – 19 infection, as well as of the health-care waste produced by the COVID-19 case.
- Ensuring safe handling (containment and packing) and safe storage of the biohazardous waste in dedicated trash bins, either directly at the BCP or at the BP Sector, until their collection for transport, safe disposal and treatment by a local waste management company<sup>15</sup>.
- Disposal of the biohazardous waste in dedicated biohazardous trash bins that should be equipped with lid and pedal (including yellow biohazardous waste bags, marked with the respective pictogram), labelled with the pictogram “Biohazard” and provide information on the capacity of the

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<sup>14</sup> Border Police is not in possession of UV-C germicidal lamps yet. These are to be bought by the IOM project.

<sup>15</sup> “Ecostat LTD” company.



container, method of use, schedule of emptying it, name of the BCP using it, the person responsible for managing it, etc.

### *Suggestions*

The procedures developed and implemented by the Moldovan Border Police, although good and overall compliant with WHO and IOM recommendations for detecting, notification on and handling of ill travellers, the following aspects could be improved:

- Development of the electronic version of the *Registry of travellers suspected of COVID – 19 infection, detected at the BCP*, making it available on the institution' intranet and giving access to it for all the relevant BP subdivisions;
- Development of a detailed SOP for the safe disposal and management of waste, including of used PPE and from a case or suspected case of contamination;
- Sharing the BP's new SOP on combating the transmission of COVID – 19 pandemic at BCPs, with the other authorities present at the BCP for joint application, especially regarding the use of PPE and the implementation of the sanitary measures, recommended by WHO and IOM;
- Raising awareness of the public health concerns, including of COVID – 19 infection and the recommended rules of behaviour also through audio-visual means, particularly in Chisinau International Airport BCP, for more efficiency and targeting of deaf travellers;
- Combination of exit/screening procedures with the testing of some categories of travellers at the entry into the country or requesting the proof of a negative molecular test result (PCR) for SARS – COVID – 19, performed up to 72 hours before their entry into the country;
- Frequent air purification in the BCPs' indoor crowded spaces, and, more specifically, the isolation rooms/spaces, with appropriate air sterilizing equipment, additionally to cleaning and disinfecting the BCP working spaces.

## **3.2 Assessment of available and needed equipment for detection and disinfection**

### *Detection Equipment*

Currently, Border Police has in possession scarce essential detection equipment which does not allow for a consistent and accurate detection of ill travellers, suspected of COVID – 19 infectious disease, at most target BCPs, except for Chişinău International Airport. This sometimes leads to false calls to the emergency service and to slowing down of the overall border control procedure.

The following detection equipment is used by the Border Police for the entry and exit screening of travellers (see Annex 1, Table 1, for the exact number of units for each type of available equipment, per BCP):

- BRAV IT – 122 simple handheld infrared digital thermometers, used at all BCPs for non – touch temperature measurement of travellers, with a measurement distance of 3 – 15 cm from the traveller, which does not allow maintaining a distance of at least 1 m from him/her. These thermometers also require an operating temperature range from + 15 °C to + 25° C for proper functioning. Consequently, they have a low accuracy of reading, when used below or above these temperatures. 49 units are now available at all assessed BCPs.
- FLIR T530 professional thermal imaging camera, used for non-touch temperature measurement of travellers at Chişinău International Airport. It allows for 0.05 – 40 m +/-1 % of measured distance, and, thus, ensures maintaining a significant distance between the border police officers and the travellers, as well as the fluidity of travellers' flow. This is an infrared smart camera, sensitive enough to detect temperature differences of 40mK NETD/0.05°C and with an extended thermometry range of -20°C to 1200°C, an accuracy of +/-2 °C or +/-2 % of reading and an operating temperature range

of – 15 °C to + 50°C. 1 unit was made available at the Chişinău International Airport, by “Avia Invest LTD” company.

- Hikvision, DS-2TD 2617b – 6PA professional thermal imaging camera. 3 units were made available at Chişinău International Airport, by “Avia – Invest LTD” company.
- PC computers and monitors for the visualization and processing of data provided by FLIR T530 and Hikvision thermal imaging cameras. 4 units were made available at Chişinău International Airport, by “Avia-Invest LTD” company.
- FLIR A310 thermal imaging camera is available, but broken by a third party, therefore its reparation lays behind and cannot be used.
- FLIR T 365 thermal imaging camera used for non-touch temperature measurement of travellers at Leuşeni-Albiţa BCP, with a field of view of minimum 0.4m, allowing for maintaining more than 1.5 m from the travellers, and ensuring the fluidity of travellers’ flow. This is an infrared smart and compact camera, with a 50mK NETD/0.05°C thermal sensitivity, an extended thermometry range of -20°C to 1200°C, an accuracy of +/- 2 °C or +/- 2 % of reading and an operating temperature range of – 15 °C to + 50°C. 1 unit was made available at the BCP, as a result of temporarily borrowing it from the “Timofei Moşneaga” Republican Clinical Hospital.

### *Suggested detection equipment*

The following more efficient and reliable detection and communication equipment is suggested to be used for detection of ill travellers at the BCPs and risk communication on COVID – 19 virus during the entry/exit screening procedure (*see Annex 1, Table 1*, for the list of additionally needed equipment, per BCP and *Annex 4* for the technical specifications of the suggested equipment):

- Handheld IR Thermography Camera, to be used at all assessed BCPs for non – touch temperature measurement of travellers. The suggested thermography camera operates in more extreme weather conditions, having an operating temperature range from -10 °C to 50 °C from, a thermometry range of -20C to +550C and an accuracy of reading of +/- 2 °C. This Thermography Camera allows to maintain a physical distance of 1,5 – 2 m from the traveller.
- Professional Thermal Camera with MSX, to be used at ground border crossing points with the highest flow of travellers, i.e. Leuşeni-Albiţa, on exit/entry directions and Sculeni-Sculeni BCPs, on the entry direction. It allows for measuring a 0.05 – 40 m +/-1 % distance, and, thus, ensures maintaining a significant distance between the border police officers and the travellers. At the same time, this professional thermal imaging camera will ensure the fluidity of travellers’ flow, and, consequently streamline and accelerate the entry and exit screening during the border control procedure at the most crossed BCPs. This is an infrared smart camera, with a 40mK NETD/0.05°C thermal sensitivity, an extended thermometry range of -20°C to 1500°C, an accuracy of +/- 2 °C or +/- 2 % of reading, an operating temperature range of – 15 °C to + 50°C and digital zoom of - 1-6x.
- PC Computers (with monitor, mouse, keyboard) for the processing and visualization of data provided by the Professional Thermal Cameras.
- TV screen, LED 43" Smart, to be used for the implementation of an intensive risk communication campaign at Chisinau International Airport BCP, related to COVID – 19 infection prevention measures, important announcements, guidelines on using protective equipment etc. The equipment will also serve for deaf travellers arriving at the BCP.

### *Disinfection equipment*

There is basically no disinfection equipment available at the 12 (twelve) target BCPs, a situation which is similar at the other BCPs, except for the availability of 1,5 - 3L portable disinfectant sprayers that are used for spraying the working surfaces in the border control booths (workstation, desk, magnifiers, border control equipment, furniture etc.) with disinfectant solutions. These sprayers do not allow for an efficient, regular or ad-hoc disinfecting of larger surfaces, i.e. after interacting with a suspected case of COVID – 19 infection, in

accordance with the WHO recommendations. Neither hand sanitizer, nor hand sanitizer equipment is sufficiently available for the travellers in all triage and isolation spaces. In only some border control booths touch hand sanitizer dispensers have been installed.

It is also noteworthy to mention that, despite the WHO recommendations<sup>16</sup>, the small surfaces of the isolation rooms and their location, in most cases, very closely to the working spaces of the border crossing personnel, do not currently allow for their good ventilation. Therefore, frequent air sterilization in these rooms is recommended. However, no air sterilizing/purification equipment (UVC lamps or nebulizers) or air ventilation system is available at the BCPs. Currently, the BP is contracting air purification services, including the use of a nebulizer, at very high and unplanned costs (*see Annex 1, Table 2*, for the exact number of units for each type of available equipment, per BCP).

### *Suggested disinfection equipment*

The following more efficient disinfection equipment is suggested to be used for disinfecting the BCPs' work spaces and surfaces (including the border control halls, epidemiological screening areas, the isolation rooms/areas and other public spaces in the BCPs), as well as for maintaining the hand hygiene of the border police officers (*see Annex 1, Table 2*, for the list of additionally needed equipment, per BCP and *Annex 4* for the technical specifications of the suggested equipment):

- Automatic/non-touch hand sanitizer dispensers, 1,2 L, for the border control booths and for the BCPs' public spaces, intended for the hand hygiene of both the border police officers and of the travellers.
- Floor stand with automatic/non-touch hand sanitizer dispenser already included, inox, to be placed in the outdoor public spaces of the BCPs that do not have border control halls, intended for the hand hygiene of both the border police officers and the travellers.
- Mechanical biocide portable sprayer, 10 L for disinfection of external surfaces with biocidal solution.
- Mini Safe Step Carpets, 950x700x45/645x440, disinfectant absorption capacity ~ 2.5 L, for disinfecting the travellers' footsteps at the entry in the border control halls or the epidemiological screening areas of the BCPs with the highest flow of travellers.
- UV-C flow germicidal lamp AS-055 – ST model, mobile, with 2 UV-C – internal tubes of 55W, disinfecting an area of 50 - 150 m<sup>3</sup>. The lamp will be used for intensive disinfection of the air, by means of the inside UV-C flow chamber, in the isolation rooms/spaces, in the presence of people. The lamp has shown an efficiency of killing over 90% of germs present in the air, only after 4 hours of functioning, and 98.86 – 99.51 % of germs, after 8 hours of functioning. It is recommended to equip every target BCP with at least one lamp, and the BCP with the highest flow of travellers, i.e. Leuşeni-Albița BCP, with two lamps for the triage areas (both on the entry and exit direction), as well.
- ULV Generator Bure extensive space mobile electrical nebulizer, to be used for additional efficient regular and ad-hoc sterilization of the air in the BCPs' internal spaces (in the set up epidemiological triage areas, isolation rooms/spaces, work spaces, control booths), with biocidal solution, with a capacity of covering up to 100 m<sup>2</sup> and the power of diffusing particles of 10-50 microns.

### **3.3 Assessment of available and needed triage and isolation facilities and infrastructure**

In order to prevent the spread of the COVID – 19 infectious disease at the BCPs, in compliance with the WHO recommendations, the BP has set up four distinguished access zones in the BCPs:

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<sup>16</sup> WHO Interim Guidance, *Management of ill travellers at Points of Entry (international airports, seaports and ground crossings) in the context of COVID – 19*, 19 March 2020; WHO Interim Guidance, *Water, sanitation, hygiene, and waste management for the COVID – 19 virus*, 23 April 2020.

1. Zone of access to/from the BCP, established at the entry in the BCP.
2. Epidemiological triage zone, dedicated to carrying out the interview, based on the filled in epidemiological fiche (only on the entry direction), and body thermography of persons crossing the border.
3. Zone/room/spaces for the temporary isolation of travellers with suspected COVID-19 infection, set up separately from the flow of travellers, either inside, in the event of presence of a border control hall on the premises of the BCP or outside.
4. Quarantine zone for temporary quarantining the means of transportation (vehicle, bus, plane etc.), in case of detection of more than one suspected case of COVID – 19 infection, set up on the premises of the BCP.
5. Document Control Zone set up separately from the other zones, for carrying the document control procedure, as well as of for checking the validity of data included in the epidemiological fiches (border control booths or border control halls).

Dedicated triage spaces for the epidemiological entry and exit screening of travellers have been identified and set up in most of 12 (twelve) target BCPs either inside the building on the premises of the BCP, or outside, just before going to the border control booths. However, only 8 (eight) BCPs out of the 12 (twelve) target BCPs have border control halls, inside which triage areas have been set up. For the exact distribution of available control halls per BCP, please see *Annex 1, Table 3*. All the triage areas dedicated for the entry epidemiological screening only are equipped with a table, where the travellers fill in the epidemiological fiches and have their body temperature measured.

Travelers in the triage area have access to the public toilets available at each BCP, which have also access to hand washing equipment, with access to technical water, with the exception of the Giurgiulești-Reni BCP, where such equipment does not exist, given that its premises are constructed on a bridge. The services working in the respective BCP need to carry water tanks to the BCP. Five of the target 12 (twelve) BCPs have only by one pair of toilets (by one for men and women), while Giurgiulești-Reni BCP has only one bio toilet for the whole its premises.

Additionally, in coordination with the Customs Service, Border Police identified appropriate facilities for the temporary isolation of ill travellers and implemented the necessary health and sanitary measures for their regular disinfection. Due to its small premises, only Otaci-Moghilev-Podolsk BCP does not have any room or space dedicated to the isolation of sick travellers.

The existent isolation spaces are very small, with as surface ranging from 6 to 18 m<sup>2</sup>, and, thus, can accommodate from 1 (one) to 4 (four) persons each. Basically, all of them, except for the isolation room of Chișinău International Airport BCP, are only partially equipped. For instance, only 5 (five) isolation rooms are equipped with a bed, while only other 5 (five) isolation rooms have separate access to a private toilet and technical water. No isolation room has access to drinking water. Also, only 2 (two) BCPs are equipped with a separate trash bin for the use of the sick travellers. The isolation room of Chișinău International Airport BCP is the only one fully equipped, in accordance with the WHO recommendations, however it can temporarily host up to 2 (two) persons only. In the event of a larger number of suspected cases of COVID – 19 infection, this isolation room won't have enough space. For a detailed list of available furniture and equipment (including sanitary equipment and for access to technical and drinking water) in the isolation rooms/spaces and triage spaces, please see *Annex 1, Table 3*.

#### *Suggestions for the triage and isolation facilities and infrastructure*

Given that not all BCPs have border control halls with set up indoor triage areas, the epidemiological triage of travellers during the cold or hot season might be a challenge, as WHO does not recommend carrying out document control procedure by means of entering inside the vehicle (e.g. bus, minibus). Therefore, the set up and use of triage medical tents is recommended in these cases.

According with the WHO recommendations, the isolation facilities should meet the following requirements, ensuring the most comfortable conditions possible for the ill travellers that are waiting for transportation to a medical facility:

1. The room should have a good temperature and be well - ventilated (for example with windows or doors open, weather permitting);
2. The room should ensure that at least 1 m of spatial separation can be maintained among the ill travellers who are waiting, in the event there is more than one sick traveller.
3. The room should be furnished with: a table to eat at; ideally, a bed for ill travellers that are in a critical state, also allowing for medical examination; with enough chairs or other places to sit, from plastic or a material resistant to water, to be easily cleaned. Blankets should also be available, upon request.
4. Tissues, masks and other waste generated in the isolation area and by travellers with suspected COVID-19 infection should be placed in a separate container with a lid in the isolation room and disposed of according to the SOP and internal regulations for infectious waste management.
5. The room should be ideally be equipped with a bathroom/toilet for the sole use of people with suspected COVID-19 infection. In case this is not possible a dedicated toilet should be designated or special sanitary equipment provided for the sole use of ill travellers.
6. The room should be ideally be equipped with a sink for washing hands and soap. In case this is not possible, a disinfecting alcohol-based hand rub should be available.
7. Drinking water should be available in the isolation room. Also, the ill traveller should be provided with food, depending on his/her ability to eat.

Therefore, the following furniture and equipment for the isolations rooms/spaces and triage spaces is recommended to be installed at the BCPs (*see Annex 1, Table 3*, for a detailed list of additionally needed furniture and equipment (including sanitary equipment and for access to technical and drinking water, per BCP and *Annex 4* for the technical specifications of the suggested equipment):

- Small isolation tents, 5m length x 3m width x 3m height, floor - 0.9mm thickness, with two entries with zip and a separate section dedicated to clothing and unclothing of the PPE, to be used by the BCPs that do not have a (proper) isolation room;
- Large triage tents, 5m length x 4m width x 3m height, floor - 0.9mm thickness, with two entries with zip, and a separate section dedicated to clothing and unclothing of the PPE, to be used by the BCPs that do not have a border control hall, and, therefore, indoor epidemiological triage spaces;
- Cabinet, 500 cm length x 400 width x 1620 cm height, for the isolation room/tents;
- Medical examination couch for the ill travellers that are in a critical state and intended for the medical examination of the patient, to be installed in the isolation rooms/tents, 1900cm length x 580 cm width x 530cm height;
- Led Lights for the triage and isolation tents;
- Multi outlet surge protected power strip, 6 outlets, 16A, electrical line conditioners LC, for plugging in the equipment available in the isolation and triage tents;
- Hot Air Generator, to be installed in the triage and isolation tents during the cold weather;
- Tables, for the triage and isolation tents;
- Chairs, for the triage and isolation tents/rooms, 520 cm length 460cm width 825 cm height;
- Sanitary equipment/facilities for 6 (six) BCPs that are lacking the respective equipment/facilities. The availability of the respective sanitary equipment is highly recommended in the event of even more infectious diseases than COVID – 19 (e.g. Ebola), for which bio waste equipment could be temporarily purchased;
- 10 L lined trash bins, with lid and pedal, for the safe disposal of ill travellers' waste.

### **3.4. Assessment of available and needed sanitary equipment, and of access to technical and drinking water**

As mentioned above, the Moldovan Border Police does not have any legal control over the infrastructure available at the BCPs, given that the legal owner of the infrastructure of the road BCPs is the Customs Services, under the Ministry of Finance, in the case of Giurgiulești International Free Port is the state company “Giurgiulești International Free Port”, in the case of the railway BCPs, is the State Enterprise “Moldovan Railways” and the administrator of the premises of Chișinău International Airport is “Avia- Invest LTD” company. Therefore, any suggestions with regards to improving the BCP infrastructure should be proposed to and coordinated with these institutions and companies and taken in consideration during the related planned reconstruction works.

Thus, it is noteworthy to mention that all the 12 (twelve) target BCPs are equipped with at least one toilet. However, 5 (five) of the target twelve (12) target BCPs have only by one pair of toilets (for men and women) while Giurgiulești-Reni BCP has only one bio toilet for the whole its premises. At the same time, the Otaci-Moghilev-Podolsk BCP staff, has currently access to only a private toilet, situated nearby the BCP, and where the sanitary and hygienic conditions required for preventing the spread of COVID – 19 infection are not respected. This is caused by a situation in which the existent sanitary block belongs to a private company, therefore the BP does not have any control over the respective premises. However, a newly build toilet on the premises of the BCP, although fully functional, is still not open for use. In the case of all the 5 (five) mentioned BCPs, the BP staff uses the same toilets that are also open for the public. Another issue is that in some insulated cases, even though the BCP is equipped with private toilets for the staff working at the border crossings, the BP staff does not have access to them. In the conditions of a pandemic, such as COVID -19, the lack of separate access to sanitary block for the BCPs staff could leave them unprotected against potential contamination with the infection.

All the BCPs have access to hand washing equipment and technical water, except for the Giurgiulești-Reni BCP, where such equipment does not exist, given that its premises are constructed on a bridge. The authorities working in the respective BCP need to carry water tanks to the BCP. The conditions of the public sanitary block that gives access to handwashing equipment and technical water to the staff of the Otaci-Moghilev-Podolsk BCP are also not satisfactory.

At the same time, the BP officers at basically all BCPs have access to drinking water, except for the staff from Otaci-Moghilev-Podolsk and Criva-Mamaliga BCPs.

It is also important to mention that only 6 (six) out of 12 (twelve) target BCPs have toilets adapted to the persons with disabilities and only 5 (five) of them have a mother and child room. For a detailed list of available sanitary equipment and of equipment providing access to technical and drinking water at BCPs, please see *Annex 1, Table 4*.

#### *Suggested sanitary equipment, technical and drinking water available for the BCP staff*

In the conditions of a public health risk, related to the spread of an infectious disease, it is suggested that the BCPs' staff is given access to private sanitary block, that would allow them be protected from potential contamination with the infection. In this context, the following actions are suggested (for a detailed list of additionally needed sanitary equipment and of equipment providing access to technical and drinking water at the BCPs, per BCP, please see *Annex 1, Table 4*):

- Coordinate with the Customs Service the possibility of providing access for the BP border crossing staff to the private toilets available at the BCP for the Customs Service staff, if any (e.g. Sculeni - Sculeni BCP, Cahul - Oancea BCP) or of taking into consideration the building of private toilets during the planned reparation works, where it is the case. This topic could also be put on the agenda of an upcoming meeting of the National Council on Integrated Border Management;
- Coordinate with the Customs Service, the urgent opening of the new toilets repaired at the Otaci-Moghilev-Podolsk BCP, for general use;

- Upgrade the BCP toilets with sanitary blocks for the persons with disabilities and mother and child sections, where these do not exist;
- Provide the BP border crossing staff with drinking water, where this is not provided;
- Equip the Giurgiulești-Reni BCP with hand washing equipment;
- Take into consideration the need to supplement some BCPs, particularly those with a high flow of travellers, with public toilets, where there is only by one toilet for women and men.

### **3.5. Assessment of available and needed waste management equipment**

In the wake of the COVID – 19 outbreak, 5 (five) of the target BCPs have been equipped with regular trash bins with a lid for disposal of PPE, the contents of which are directly collected by a local waste management company, for safe transportation, treatment and disposal. In the case of the other BCPs, the bags with the disposed PPE are brought at the Border Police Sector for collection and storage in special containers, from where they are picked up for safe transportation, treatment and disposal by a contracted waste management company, and in the case of Palanca-Maiaki – Udobnoe BCP, by the hospital of Ștefan – Vodă rayon. Basically none of these trash bins/containers are intended for safe disposal, as for instance, they are not equipped with clearly marked yellow bags for biohazardous waste, have a pedal, that would avoid direct contact with the trash bins, or are clearly labelled with the pictogram “Biohazard”. For a detailed list of the waste management equipment available at the BCPs, per BCP, please see *Annex 1, Table 5*.

#### *Suggestions for waste management equipment*

According to the WHO recommendations, the waste from used PPEs and from a case or suspected case of contamination should be collected in clearly marked lined trash bins/containers, labelled as biohazardous waste, and properly equipped for the safe disposal of the waste, i.e. with a lid and, preferably, a pedal. Therefore, it is suggested that all the BCPs are equipped with (For a detailed list of additionally needed waste management equipment, please see *Annex 1, Table 5*):

- 80 L trash bins/containers, equipped with a lid and pedal and clearly labelled as biohazardous waste (with the pictogram “Biohazard”);
- Clearly marked trash bags for infectious waste (i.e. of yellow colour and marked with the pictogram “Biohazard”).

## **4. Training**

The BP personnel benefits from initial (provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs Police Academy and the Centre of Excellence in Border Security) and continuous training on the normative and legislative framework for the fulfilment of the institutional missions and competencies, including related to managing public health risks at BCPs, according to the training curricula for the staff of the BP. However, the BP’s internal resources to offer practical training and operational tactical exercises on responding to public health risks related to the spread of pandemics is limited.

Before the COVID – 19 outbreak, the BP border crossing staff has benefited from a series of theoretical multi-hazard trainings, organized with support from the international partners and intended to strengthen its capacity to detect and effectively respond to public health risks, including from WHO. Although the BP staff has also participated in operational tactical exercises, including simulation activities, table top and practical field exercises, these focused more on responding to mass-casualty incidents, public health emergencies linked to the release of chemical or radiological materials, bioterrorism, and less on responding to public health risks related to the spread of pandemics.

Throughout February – March 2020, the capacity of the BCP staff to respond to the COVID – 19 public health crisis has been strengthened through a series of trainings organized by the Medical Centre of the GIBP on:

- the measures to prevent COVID – 19 transmission at BCPs, i.e. on: personal hygiene (correct hand hygiene), workplace hygiene, appropriate clothing and unclothing of PPE (long-sleeved gowns, masks, gloves, face shield or goggles);
- carrying out the interview and the exit/entry screening of travellers (filling in the epidemiological fiche, body thermometry);
- the education of travellers, including sick travellers, their families and travel companions on the COVID – 19 infection, the related risks and prevention measures needed to be undertaken;
- the use of disinfecting equipment and means for sanitizing the BCP workplaces.

Based on the commonly agreed cooperation plans, the NPHA, has also organized some trainings for the GIBP. One of the trainings has been provided by the institution for the border crossing personnel of Chişinău Airport, covering all the above-mentioned topics. However, no similar trainings have been organized by the agency for the other BCPs.

The staff of the BP Medical Centre has also been trained by the NPHA on biological samples collection from persons who meet the criteria for the definition of suspected case for being tested for COVID – 19, establishing diagnosis of COVID – 19, surveillance, treatment, identification of contacts of the suspected cases, placing in quarantine, in accordance with the approved National Clinical Protocol, that complies with the WHO recommendations.

Among other training needs border police officers at the BCPs mentioned:

- safe disposal and management of waste from used PPEs and from a suspected case of contamination;
- organization of Operational Tactical Exercises, including simulations and tabletop exercises for the borders crossing personnel covering the management of public health crisis related to risk of spread of pandemics, in cooperation with international partners;
- unclothing of the PPE.

### *Suggestions*

The capacity of Border Police staff should be continuously strengthened through theoretical, but also practical field activities, simulations and tabletop exercises, including with the participation of other authorities that are present at the BCP and in cooperation with various partners. The NPHA should be involved in systematically training the staff of all designated BCPs.

Also, in order to ensure that the epidemiological entry/exit screening procedures are efficiently carried out, and the purchased equipment is properly used, it is important that the personnel is trained on the use of the procured detection and disinfecting equipment, as well as the newly developed SOP for combating the transmission of COVID – 19 pandemic at BCPs. Additionally, trainings on the management of infectious waste from used PPEs and from confirmed cases or suspected cases of contamination should be also continuously carried out for the border crossing staff.

Therefore, it is recommended that the trainings on the SOPs for combating the transmission of COVID – 19 pandemic at BCPs and for the safe disposal and management of the infectious waste, as well as on the use of the procured equipment are integrated in the BP training system. In the context of the COVID – 19 pandemic it is recommended that the trainings take place online. It is suggested that these unfold as follows:



1. Train – the trainers (ToT) course. It is recommended that the trainings for the use of the purchased equipment are organized by the vendor, whereas for the SOPs, by the authors of the SOPs, with the participation of the BP medical staff, while respecting all the necessary health and sanitary measures;
2. Initial training for the border crossing personnel, including the current equipment users, held by the trainers mentioned under the point 1.
3. Continuous training/on the job training held by the trained trainers and the medical staff.
4. Training of the newly appointed staff held by the trained trainers and the medical staff.

## **5. Conclusions and recommendations**

The current assessment has identified a large array of efforts carried out by the BP to ensure core and minimum capacities for infection control and response to public health emergencies related to the spread of communicable diseases of international concern, in this case of COVID – 19 infection, in compliance with the IHR (2005).

Therefore, the Moldovan legislation has been adjusted to the IHR provisions, and internal regulations, instructions/guidelines have been developed and regularly updated. Moreover, a recent SOP for combating the transmission of COVID – 19 infection at BCPs, was developed to comply with the IHR, as well as other WHO and IOM latest guidelines and recommendations. Joint Action Plans/SOPs for improving monitoring, detection, notification, preparedness, intervention and response to public health emergencies have also been signed between the BP, the Customs Service and the relevant public health and emergency medical care authorities and are being implemented, including to ensure the access of the emergency medical care services to the BCPs for examination and transportation of ill travellers to medical care facilities.

Although the BP border crossing personnel has benefited from institutional internal and external training on theoretic aspects of implementing the IHR provisions, as well as practical exercises on responding to public health emergencies (chemical or radiological hazards, bioterrorism etc.), none of these have addressed the response to risks related to the spread of pandemics. Therefore, the capacity of Border Police staff should be continuously strengthened through theoretical, but also practical field activities, simulations and tabletop exercises, including with the participation of other authorities that are present at the BCP and in cooperation with various partners.

Although initially a list of 6 (six) BCPs have been designated for having their core capacities strengthened for emergency response and infection control, the COVID – 19 outbreak showed the need to update and possibly extend the list of the respective BCPs. Any of such endeavours should be consulted with other national authorities, including the Customs Service, and negotiated at bilateral level with the neighbouring countries.

*Regarding the equipment available at the BCPs for carrying entry/exit screening*, the assessment showed that this is insufficient and of low – quality, creating an issue of accuracy of collected thermometry data. Therefore, the BCPs should be equipped with additional equipment with a higher accuracy of reading thermometry data, in cooperation with the international partners.

*Regarding the equipment for disinfection*, this is also insufficient in order to ensure implementation of the WHO-recommended health and sanitary measures, including for maintaining workplace and personal hygiene of both the border crossing personnel, as well as of the public arriving at BCPs. The equipment intended for disinfection of surfaces and crowded indoor, including isolation rooms/spaces at BCPs is also insufficient.

*Regarding the equipment for waste management from COVID-19 virus*, although arrangements with a local company for the safe collection, transportation and disposal of infectious waste are in place, this was insufficient in the isolation facilities and the triage areas established at the BCPs.

*Regarding the triage areas for carrying out the entry/exit screening procedures*, these have been established either in indoor or outdoor areas on the BCP premises. For carrying out the procedures in rainy, cold or hot weather, suggestions for acquiring medical tents and properly equipping them, have been made.

*Regarding the isolation facilities*, although dedicated spaces for them have been established at basically all assessed BCPs, except for one BCP, these are very small and not properly equipped, due to the lack of available spaces on the BCP premises. Only a small number of isolation rooms have separate sanitary facilities. The only fully equipped isolation room is the one belonging to Chisinau International Airport. Therefore, suggestions for acquiring medical tents to serve as isolation spaces and properly equipping them, have been made.

*Regarding WASH facilities*, these are available at all BCPs, but are not enough given the large flow of passengers passing through them, especially during some periods of the year (summer and winter holidays). A drawback is the lack of separate access for the BP border personnel staff to sanitary facilities, which expose them to heightened risk of getting infected during public health emergencies linked to the spread of communicable diseases.

It is also important that the suggestions regarding the improvement of WASH and isolation infrastructure are taken into consideration by the institutions or companies administering the BCP premises, of each type, i.e. road, air, river or railway, including in their plans and projects intended for the development of the infrastructure of the respective premises.

A compiled list of existent and additionally needed equipment for detection, disinfection of spaces and waste management, as well as of WASH and isolation facilities and infrastructure available and needed at BCPs is proposed in *Annex 1*.

To conclude, although the entry/exit screening procedures are generally recommended as a measure to ensure infection control at BCPs and prevent its further domestic and international spread, it is more efficient if these are accompanied by risk communication related to COVID – 19 infection, prevention measures, as well as, carrying out contact tracing together with the collection of passenger locator data.

## Annexes

Annex 1

**List of Border Police existent and additionally needed equipment and facilities to prevent cross-border transmission of diseases with high risk for public health at BCPs**

**Table1. Detection equipment**

No	Border Crossing Points	Existent				Additionally needed				
		Digital Infrared Thermometer	Handheld IR Thermography Camera	Computer PC (monitor, mouse, keyboard)	Thermal Imaging Camera	Digital Infrared Thermometer	Handheld IR Thermography Camera	Handheld IR Thermography Camera (covered by IOM) <sup>17</sup>	Computer PC (monitor, mouse, keyboard)	Thermal Imaging Camera
1.	Leușeni-Albița, Road, international	6	-	-	1 (borrowed) FLIR T-365	-	2	1	2	2
2.	Giurgiulești-Galați, Road, international	3	-	-	-	-	4	1	-	-
3.	Giurgiulești-Reni, Road Joint BCP, international (only exit direction)	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-
4.	Sculeni-Sculeni, Road, international	4	-	-	-	-	4	1	1	1 (entry)
5.	Cahul-Oancea, Road, international	1	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-

<sup>17</sup> The equipment has been provided by IOM under the “Strengthening the Republic of Moldova’s National Response to the COVID-19 Crisis”, Phase I

6.	Tudora-Starokazacie, road, international	4	-	-	-	-	3	1	-	-
7.	Palanca-Maiaki – Udobnoe Joint BCP, road, international (entry/exit direction)	4	-	-	-	-	3	1	-	-
8.	Otaci-Moghilev-Podolsk, road, international	7	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-
9.	Criva-Mamaliga, road, international (only entry direction)	6	-	-	-	-	4	1	-	-
10.	Chişinău airport, air, international	11	-	-	3 (4 Avia – Invest; 1- belonging to BP is broken) FLIR T530		2	1	-	-
11.	Giurgiulesti Free International Port, river, international	1	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-
12.	Ungheni-Iaşi railway, international	1	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-
	Total	49	0	-	5	-	31	10	-	3

Table 2. Disinfecting Equipment

	Border Crossing Points	Existent							Additionally needed								
		Non – Contact Hand Sanitizer Dispenser for the border control booths	Non – Contact Hand Sanitizer Dispenser for the public	Regular Hand Sanitizer Dispenser for the border control booths	Regular Hand Sanitizer Dispenser for the public	Nebulizer	Portable Disinfectant Sprayer (1,5 – 3 L)	Disinfecting lamp	Non – Contact Hand Sanitizer for the border control booths	Non – Contact Hand Sanitizer Dispenser for the border control booths (Covered by IOM) <sup>18</sup>	Non – Contact Hand Sanitizer for the public	Non – Contact Hand Sanitizer Dispenser for the public (Covered by IOM) <sup>19</sup>	Nebulizer	Nebulizer <sup>20</sup> (covered by IOM)	Portable Disinfectant Sprayer	Portable Sprayer <sup>21</sup> (10 L)	Disinfecting lamp <sup>22</sup>
1.	Leușeni-Albița, Road, international	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	4	-	2	2	1	1	1 (10L)	-	2
2.	Giurgiulești-Galați, Road, international	-	-	5	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	2	1	1	1 (10L)	1 (10 L)	1
3.	Giurgiulești-Reni, Road Joint BCP,	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	1 (10L)	1 (10 L)	1

<sup>18</sup> The equipment has been provided by IOM under the “Strengthening the Republic of Moldova’s National Response to the COVID-19 Crisis”, Project, Phase I<sup>19</sup> Same as above<sup>20</sup> Same as above<sup>21</sup> Same as above<sup>22</sup> Disinfecting lamps will be provided by IOM under the “Strengthening the Republic of Moldova’s National Response to the COVID-19 Crisis”, Project, Phase I

	international (only exit direction)																
4.	Sculeni-Sculeni, Road, international	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	2	2	2	1	-	1 (10L)	1 (10 L)	1
5.	Cahul-Oancea, Road, international	-	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	1 (10L)	1 (10 L)	1
6.	Tudora-Starokazacie, road, international	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	2	2	2	1	-	1 (10L)	-	1
7.	Palanca-Maiaki – Udobnoe Joint BCP, Road, international (entry/exit direction)	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	4 (outside the control booths)	-	2	2	1	1	1 (10L)	1 (10 L)	1
8.	Otaci-Moghilev-Podolsk, Road, international	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	2	2	2	-	-	1 (10L)	-	1
9.	Criva-Mamaliga, vehicle, international (only entry direction)	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	2	2	1	1	1 (10L)	1 (10 L)	1
10.	Chişinău airport, international	-	-	-	4	-	1	-	-	-	2	2	1	1	1 (10L)	1 (10 L)	1
11.	Giurgiulesti International Free Port, river	-	-	2	-	-	1		-		1	-	-	-	1 (10L)	-	-
12.	Ungheni-Iaşi railway, international	-	-	-	-	-	1		1		1	-	-	-	1 (10L)	-	-
	Total	0	0	10	6	0	12	0	17	6	19	17	6	5	12	7	11

Table 3. Triage and isolation facilities and equipment

	Existent	Additionally needed
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	Border Crossing Points	Border Control Hall (also used as triage area for entry and exit screening of screening)	TV screen, LED for risk communication	Isolation room	Isolation Tent	Separate sanitary block (WC and access to technical water)/equipment for the isolation room/space	Bed for the isolation room/space	Table for the isolation room/space	Chairs for the isolation room/space	Medical cabinet for the isolation room/space	Trash Bin (10 L with pedal)	Water Cooler	Triage Tent	Hot Air generator	Multi-Outlet Extension Cord	LED Lights	TV screen, LED for risk communication	Isolation room	Isolation Tent	Separate sanitary block (WC and access to technical water)/equipment for the isolation room/space	Bed for the isolation room/space	Table for the isolation or triage room/space	Chairs for the isolation or triage room/space	Medical cabinet for the isolation room/space	Trash Bin (10 L with pedal)	Water Cooler <sup>23</sup>	Triage Tent	Hot Air generator	Multi-Outlet Extension Cord	LED Lights
1.	Leușeni-Albița, Road, international	2 (entry /exit)	-	1	-	2	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	4	1	3	1	-	1	1	1
2.	Giurgiulești-Galați, Road, international	1 (entry)	-	1	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	7	1	2	1	(entry/ exit)	1	1	1
3.	Giurgiulești-Reni, Road Joint BCP, international (only exit direction)	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	1 (exit only)	1	1	1
4.	Sculeni-Sculeni, Road, international	2 (entry/ exit, for	-	1	-	-	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	4	1	3	1	1	-	-	-

<sup>23</sup> Water coolers will be provided by IOM under the “Strengthening the Republic of Moldova’s National Response to the COVID-19 Crisis”, Phase I

[illegible]

<sup>24</sup> Another room should be allocated by the airport, in case if more than 2 people need to be isolated



11	Giurgiulesti Free International Port, river, international	1 (port's hall)	-	1	-	-	1	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2 (to be temporarily allocated from the existing ones in the port)	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	
12	Ungheni - Iași railway, international	1 (railway station's hall)	-	1	-	1	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	1	-	-		-	
	Total	11	0	11	0	5 BCPs	5	11	13	0	1	0	0	0	0	0		1	3	7 BCPs	8	7	35	9	20	12	8	8	8	8

**Table 4. Sanitation, access to technical and drinking water**

	Border Crossing Points	Existent	Additionally needed
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		Separate WC for border police officers	Sink with access to technical water for border police officers	Drinking water for border police officers	Separate WC for the general public (men/women)	Sink with access to technical water for the general public	WC for persons with disabilities	Mother and child room	Separate WC for border police officers	Sink with access to technical water for border police officers	Drinking water for the border police officers	Separate WC for the general public (men/women)	Sink with access to technical water for the general public	Sink with access to technical water for the general public	Mother and child room
1.	Leușeni-Albița, Road, international	4 (2 of which are temporarily allotted for the isolation room)	4 (2 of which are temporarily allotted for the isolation room)	1	8 entry (4)/exit (4)	6	1 (entry)	1 (entry)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2.	Giurgiulești-Galați, Road, international	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
3.	Giurgiulești-Reni Joint BCP, Road, international (only exit direction)	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-

Table 5. Waste management

4.	Sculeni-Sculeni, Road, international	-	-	1	2	2	-	-	1 <sup>25</sup>	1	1	-	1	1
5.	Cahul-Oancea, Road, international	-	-	1	2	2	1	1	1 <sup>26</sup>	1	-	-	-	-
6.	Tudora-Starokazacie, road, international	1	2	1	4	4	(entry/exit)	(entry/exit)	-	-	-	-	-	-
7.	Palanca-Maiaki – Udobnoe Joint BCP, road, international (entry/exit direction)	9	9	1	6	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
8.	Otaci-Moghilev-Podolsk, road, international	-	-	-	4	3	2 are currently closed)	2 are currently closed)	1 <sup>27</sup>	-	-	-	-	-
9.	Criva-Mamaliga Joint BCP, road, international (only entry direction)	1	1	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
	1. Leuşeni-Albița, road, international				4 (yellow)	-	-	-	-	2	1	300		
	2. Giurgiulești-Galați, road, international				1	-	-	-	-	2	1	300		
	3. Giurgiulești-Reni Joint BCP, road, international (only exit direction)				8	8	2	1	-	1	-	300	-	1
10.	Chișinău airport, air, international						(entry/exit)	(exit)	-	-	-	-		(entry)
	4. Sculeni-Sculeni, Road, international				3	-	-	-	-	2	1	300		
	5. Cahul-Oancea, Road, international				2	2	-	-	-	2	1	300		
11.	Giurgiulești Free International Port, river, international				1	-	-	-	-	2	1	300	1	1
	6. Tudora-Starokazacie, road, international				1	-	-	-	-	2	1	300		
	7. Palanca-Maiaki – Udobnoe Joint BCP, road, international (entry/exit direction)				1	2	-	-	-	2	1	300		
12.	Ungheni-Iași railway international				2	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1

<sup>25</sup> There is separate access to WC and technical water for the staff of the Customs Service, which could be shared with the staff of other authorities present at the BCP, including the Border Police officers.

<sup>26</sup> Same as above.

<sup>27</sup> Same as above.

<sup>28</sup> Special Trash Bins for safe disposal of PPE, with pedal will be provided by IOM under the “Strengthening the Republic of Moldova’s National Response to the COVID-19 Crisis”, Project, Phase I

	Total		16	14	8	43	37	7	6	4	4	4	0	1	4	6
8.	Otaci-Moghilev-Podolsk, road, international		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	300				
9.	Criva-Mamaliga Joint BCP, road, international (only entry direction)		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	300				
10.	Chişinău airport, air, international		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	300				
11.	Giurgiulesti Free International Port, river, international		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	100				
12.	Ungheni-Iaşi railway, international		1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	300				
	Total		11	0	0	-	-	19	10	3400						

## Checklist for BCPs and the General Inspectorate of Border Police

## C H E S T I O N A R

pentru evaluarea necesităților Punctelor de trecere a frontiere (PTF) în domeniul WASH (aprovizionare cu apă, și activități/mijloace/echipamente de igienă și sanitare) și de realizare a măsurilor de răspuns la COVID-19 (alți agenți patogeni cu risc ridicat epidemic/pandemic - în continuare AAP) privind izolarea persoanelor suspecte de infectare cu COVID-19/AAP?

**Atenție!** Informațiile colectate cu ajutorul acestui chestionar vor fi utilizate pentru a asigura acoperirea necesităților PTF în domeniu. Drept urmare, este foarte importantă oferirea de detalii, precizări, de ordin cantitativ și calitativ cu referire la aspectele cercetate. Necesitățile identificate vor fi însoțite de calcule care le justifică.

<b>Punctul de Trecere al Frontierei (PTF)</b>				
<b>Data vizitei la PTF</b>				
<b>Întrebarea</b>		<b>DA</b>	<b>NU</b>	<b>Precizări/Explicații (Este obligatoriu de completat)</b>
<b>I</b>	<b>DOTARE CU ECHIPAMENT SPECIAL PENTRU DETECTAREA PERSOANELOR SUSPECTE DE INFECTARE CU COVID - 19</b>			
1.1	Există în dotare, la PTF, echipament pentru detectarea persoanelor cu caz probabil de infectare cu COVID-19/ATP? Sunt acestea suficiente? Care este necesarul?			
a	termometre digitale de mână			
b	termoscannere de tip staționar și mobil			
c	altele			

I.I	<b>RESURSE UMANE, PREGĂTIREA ȘI DOTAREA ACESTORA</b>			
2.1	<b>Personalul existent în PTF</b>			
2.1.1	Există, în PTF, personal cu roluri de supraveghere și implementare a măsurilor de igienă, sanitaro-epidemiologice și aprovizionare cu apă, după cum urmează:			
a	Responsabil de supravegherea/monitorizarea implementării măsurilor de securitate în domeniul sănătății publice (măsuri de igienă, sanitaro-epidemiologice, izolare etc. ) în PTF? Cine îndeplinește această rol?			
b	Medic/Asistent medical			
c	Responsabil de monitorizarea completării fișelor epidemiologice, semnării declarațiilor pe proprie răspundere? Cine îndeplinește acest rol?			
d	Responsabil de intervievarea/efectuarea triajului epidemiologic al persoanelor care traversează frontiera de stat. Cine îndeplinește acest rol?			
e	Responsabil de logistica aferentă măsurilor igienico-sanitare pentru angajații PF			
2.1.2	În opinia DVS., este necesară înființarea de funcții și/sau specifice cu atribuții privind epidemiile/pandemiile? Care este necesarul de funcții specifice?			
2.1.3	În opinia DVS., în caz de necesitate, ati putea asigura și supraveghea autocolectarea materialului, în vederea testării persoanelor suspecte de COVID-19?			
2.2	<b>Echipament personal de protecție pentru poliștii de frontieră</b>			
2.2.1	Sunt poliștii de frontieră din PTF dotați cu echipament suficient de protecție personală, după cum urmează?			
a	<i>echipamente de protecție, după cum urmează:</i>			
a1	halate hidrozistente/combinezoane de protecție			
a2	măști chirurgicale			
a3	Respiratoare			
a4	Viziere			
a5	Mănuși			

a6	substanțe biocide, altele			
b	<i>soluții dezinfectante individuale pentru mâini (cu concentrație de alcool de minim 70%)</i>			
2.2.1	Sunt polițiștii de frontieră din PTF dotați cu trusă medicală de prim ajutor medical? Necesită PTF să fie dotate cu trusă medicală? Necesită aceasta să fie suplinită cu produse farmaceutice de prim de ajutor medical? Care este necesarul ?			
2.3	<b>Pregătire/instruiri</b>			
2.3.1	A beneficiat personalul PTF de pregătirea necesară (instruiri, antrenamente etc.) privind acțiunea în contextul crizei de sănătate publică legate de COVID - 19/AAP, cu privire la:			
a	<i>măsurile de prevenire a infecției :</i>			
a1	igienă personală (spălatul corect al mâinilor)			
a2	igiena locului de muncă,			
a3	utilizarea adecvată a echipamentului de protecție (mănuși, măști, viziere, combinezoane)			
b	<i>deșfășurarea interviului/triajului epidemiologic (identificarea persoanelor cu simptome COVID-19/AAP, completarea fișei epidemiologice)</i>			
c	<i>informarea/educarea familiei, prietenilor de călătorie a persoanelor suspecte de infectare cu COVID-19/AAP</i>			
d	<i>folosirea mijloacelor/materialelor dezinfectante/de curățare</i>			
2.3.2	Ce necesități de pregătire specifică în contextul COVID-19 există și recomandați? Pot fi acoperite de IGPF? Dacă nu, de cine pot fi acoperite?			
I.I.I	<b>INFRASTRUCTURĂ ȘI MĂSURI DE IZOLARE A PERSOANELOR SUSPECTE DE INFECTARE CU COVID-19/AAP</b>			
3.1	<b>Infrastructură și măsuri de izolare/carantină</b>			
3.1.1	Există în PTF spații separate special amenajate pentru:			
a	interviarea/triajul epidemiologic persoanelor suspecte de infectare cu COVID – 19/AAP? Dacă da, ce tip de spații sunt amenajate? Care este necesarul de spații?			

b	izolarea persoanelor suspecte de infectare cu COVID – 19/AAP, pînă la transportarea acestora la instituții/spații medicale special dedicate (spitale etc.)? Dacă da, ce tip de spații sunt amenajate? Care este necesarul de spații?			
3.1.2	Dacă ați răspuns Da la întrebările 3.1.1a și b, posedă spațiile de mai sus, cu următoarele dotări separate, după cum urmează:			
3.1.2.1	<i>Spațiile dedicate interviewării/triajului epidemiologic al persoanelor care traversează frontiera de stat:</i>			
a	dotări sanitare separate (WC, chiuvete/stații de spălare a mâinilor, loc schimbare copii mici și pentru alăptare, adaptate persoanelor cu dizabilități etc.)?			
b	mobilier (scaune, mese etc.)?			
c	sisteme/echipamente de dezinfectare cu lampă UVC?			
d	Care sunt dotările sanitare/de mobilier existente? Care este necesarul de dotări ?			
3.1.2.2	<i>Spațiile dedicate izolării persoanelor suspecte de infectare cu COVID-19/AAP:</i>			
a	dotări sanitare separate (WC, chiuvete/stații de spălare a mâinilor, loc schimbare copii mici și pentru alăptare, adaptate persoanelor cu dizabilități etc.)?			
b	mobilier (scaune, mese etc.)?			
c	sisteme/echipamente de dezinfectare cu lampă UVC?			
d	Care sunt dotările sanitare/de mobilier existente? Care este necesarul de dotări ?			
3.1.3	Dacă ați răspuns Nu la întrebările 3.1.1a și/sau b, are PTF în dotare corturi/containere care pot fi amenajate pentru:			
a	interviewarea/triajul epidemiologic al persoanelor care traversează frontiera de stat? Dacă da, precizați ce tip de dotări există? Care este necesarul?			
b	și/sau izolarea persoanelor suspecte de infectare cu COVID-19/AAP, instituții/spații medicale special dedicate (spitale etc.) ?			



3.1.4	Dacă ați răspuns Da la întrebările 3.1.3a și/sau 3.1.3b, posedă aceste spații următoarele dotări, după cum urmează:			
3.1.4.1	<i>Corturile/containerele pentru interviuarea/triajul epidemiologic al persoanelor care traversează frontiera de stat</i>			
a	dotări sanitare separate? Care sunt dotările sanitare existente (WC, chiuvete/stații de spălare a mâinilor, loc schimbare copii mici și pentru alăptare, și adaptate persoanelor cu dizabilități etc.)?			
b	sisteme de iluminare pentru corturi (lumini LED, cabluri, generatoare de energie)?			
c	sisteme de încălzire pentru timpul rece?			
d	mobilier (scaune, mese etc.)?			
e	sisteme/echipamente de dezinfectare cu lampă UVC?			
f	Care sunt dotările/de mobilier existente? Care este necesarul de dotări ?			
3.1.4.2	<i>Corturile/containerele pentru izolarea persoanelor suspecte de COVID-19</i>			
a	dotări sanitare separate? Care sunt dotările sanitare existente (WC, chiuvete/stații de spălare a mâinilor, loc schimbare copii mici și pentru alăptare, și adaptate persoanelor cu dizabilități etc.)?			
b	sisteme de iluminare pentru corturi (lumini LED, cabluri, generatoare de energie)?			
c	sisteme de încălzire pentru timpul rece?			
d	mobilier (scaune, mese etc.)?			
e	sisteme/echipamente de dezinfectare cu lampă UVC?			
f	Care sunt dotările/de mobilier existente? Care este necesarul de dotări ?			

3.1.5	Permite teritoriul PTF amenajarea instalațiilor de la pct. 3.1.2, 3.1.3 și 3.1.4?			
3.1.6	Există în PTF spații special dedicate pentru efectuarea măsurilor de carantină a mijloacelor de transportului rutier de persoane, în caz de necesitate? Care este necesarul de spații?			
3.1.7	Există în PTF spații cu grup sanitar (WC, chiuvetă, stație de spălare a mâinilor, loc schimbare copii mici, și adaptate persoanelor cu dizabilități) pentru persoanele care traversează frontiera de stat? Care este necesarul?			
3.1.8	Există în PTF spații cu grup sanitar (WC, chiuvetă, stație de spălare a mâinilor) pentru polițiștii de frontieră/alt personal din PTF, separat de cel pentru persoanele care traversează frontiera de stat? Care este necesarul?			
3.1.9	Au fost stabilite măsuri de distanțare fizică/de siguranță de 1 m marcate/comunicate clar în spațiile publice din cadrul PTF (controlul documentelor de călătorie, ghișee, WC etc.)?			
3.2	<b>Aprovizionare cu apă</b>			
3.2.1	Există în PTF acces separat la apă tehnică (chiuvetă, stație de spălare a mâinilor), după cum urmează:			
a	pentru polițiștii de frontieră/alt personal din PTF?			
b	pentru persoanele care traversează frontiera de stat ?			
c	în spațiile amenajate în PTF pentru interviuare/triajul epidemiologic și/sau izolarea persoanelor suspecte de infectare cu COVID-19/AAP?			
d	Dacă e cazul, care este necesarul de dotări pentru asigurarea apei tehnice în PTF?			

3.2.2	În caz că s-a răspuns Nu la întrebarea 3.2.1, permite teritoriul PTF instalarea de echipamente specifice pentru dotarea spațiilor fără acces la apă tehnică și instalații corespunzătoare, precum stații de spălare a mâinilor?			
3.2.3	Există acces la apă potabilă pentru polițiștii de frontieră în PTF? Precizați care din elementele de mai jos sunt prezente în PTF:			
a	robinet cu apă potabilă/filtrată			
b	dozator de apă			
c	altele			
d	Din practica de până acum, este acoperit consumul necesar de apă potabilă? Care este necesarul de dotări specifice și volumul necesar de apă/lunar ?			
3.2.4	Există acces la apă potabilă în spațiile amenajate în PTF pentru intervierea/efectuarea triajului epidemiologic și/sau izolarea persoanelor suspecte de infectare cu COVID-19/AAP? Precizați care din elementele de mai jos sunt prezente în PTF și care este necesarul, după cum urmează:			
3.2.5.1	<i>În spațiile dedicate intervierei/efectuării triajului epidemiologic al persoanelor care traversează frontiera de stat</i>			
a	robinet cu apă potabilă/filtrată			
b	dozator de apă			
c	altele			
d	Din practica de până acum, este acoperit consumul necesar de apă potabilă? Care este necesarul de dotări specifice și volumul necesar de apă/lunar ?			
3.2.5.2	<i>În spațiile dedicate izolării persoanelor suspecte de infectare cu COVID-19/AAP</i>			
a	robinet cu apă potabilă/filtrată			
b	dozator de apă			
c	altele			

d	Din practica de până acum, este acoperit consumul necesar de apă potabilă? Care este necesarul de dotări specifice și volumul necesar de apă/lunar			
3.2.6	Exista acces la apa potabilă în spațiile publice ale PTF ?			
I.V	<b>APROVIZIONARE CU PRODUSE ȘI ECHIPAMENTE DE IGIENĂ ȘI SANITARE</b>			
4.1	Sunt cantitățile de echipament și produse de igienă/curățare existente la PTF pentru curățarea/menținerea igienei locului de muncă pentru polițiștii de frontieră/alt personal din PTF suficiente pentru uz curent și de rezervă? Precizați pentru fiecare din aspectele de mai jos:			
a	<i>destinat igienei personale (săpun lichid, prosoape de hârtie, hârtie igienică, dozator non contact pentru dezinfectarea mâinilor în hol și veci, soluții dezinfectante pentru mâini)</i>			
b	<i>destinat curățării/dezinfectării spațiilor de lucru :</i>			
b1	Echipamente/sisteme de dezinfectare a încăperilor cu lampă UVC?			
b2	soluții chimice și echipamente de dezinfectare a spațiilor (stropitori și soluție de biocid, alte produse chimice) ?			
b3	Altele			
c	<i>Care apreciați că este necesarul de produse de igienă/curățare pentru personalul din PTF, pentru uz curent și pentru rezervă?</i>			
4.2	Sunt cantitățile de echipament și produse de igienă/curățare/dezinfectare existente la PTF în spațiile amenajate pentru interviuarea/ triajul epidemiologic și/sau izolarea persoanelor suspecte de infectare cu COVID-19/AAP suficiente pentru uz curent și de rezervă? Precizați pentru fiecare din aspectele de mai jos, după cum urmează:			
4.2.1	<i>În spațiile dedicate interviuării/ triajului epidemiologic al persoanelor care traversează frontiera de stat:</i>			
a	destinat igienei personale (săpun lichid, prosoape de hârtie, hârtie igienică, dozator non-contact și soluții dezinfectante pentru mâini)			
b	<u>destinat curățării/dezinfectării spațiilor:</u>			

b1	sisteme/echipamente de dezinfectare a încăperilor cu lampă UVC?			
b2	soluții chimice/echipament de dezinfectare a spațiilor (stropitori și soluție de biocid, alte produse chimice) ?			
b3	Altele			
c	Care sunt cantitățile asigurate actualmente (pentru ce perioadă)? Care apreciați că este necesarul de produse de igienă/curățare al PTF, pentru uz curent și pentru rezervă?			
4.2.2	<i>În spațiile dedicate izolării persoanelor care traversează frontiera de stat:</i>			
a	destinat igienei personale (săpun lichid, prosoape de hârtie, hârtie igienică, dozator non-contact și soluții dezinfectante pentru mâini)?			
b	destinat curățării/dezinfectării spațiilor:			
b1	sisteme/echipamente de dezinfectare a încăperilor cu lampă UVC?			
b3	soluții chimice/echipament de dezinfectare a spațiilor (stropitori și soluție de biocid, alte produse chimice) ?			
b4	altele			
c	Care sunt cantitățile asigurate actualmente (pentru ce perioadă)? Care apreciați că este necesarul de produse de igienă/curățare al PTF, pentru uz curent și pentru rezervă?			
4.3	Sunt PTF dotate cu măști/mănuși de rezervă pentru persoanele care trec frontiera, care nu posedă aceste mijloace de protecție?			
4.4	Sunt accesibile dozatoare/echipamente de dezinfecție și/sau soluții dezinfectante de mâini pentru persoanele ce traversează frontiera de stat?			
V	<b>MĂSURI DE PROMOVARE A IGIENEI, ÎN CONFORMITATE CU INSTRUCȚIUNILE OMS/MINISTERULUI SĂNĂTĂȚII</b>			

5.1	Este echipamentul/mijloacele pentru efecuirea controlului la trecerea frontierei de stat (cititoare de pașapoarte, lămpi UV, lupe etc.) curățat la intervalele stabilite cu soluții pe bază de alcool?			
5.2	Considerați că infrastructura locală permite aplicarea măsurilor de securitate în domeniul sănătății publice (inclusiv în domeniul sanitaro-epidemiologic) atât pentru personalul PF, cât și pentru persoanele care traversează frontiera de stat? (Opinia personală)			
5.3	Există la PTF materiale/mijloacele de informare privind riscurile și măsurile de prevenire a infectării cu COVID-19/AAP, inclusiv obligația de respectare a regimului de auto-izolare la domiciliu (scrise, audio, video, social media etc.)? Specificați care sunt materialele/mijloacele folosite?			
5.4	Sunt materialele/mijloacele de informare adaptate/traduse în limbi de circulație internațională și ale minorităților naționale? Precizați.			
5.5	Au fost cazuri de solicitare de azil/alte forme de protecție internațională pe teritoriul RM în perioada stării de urgență și stării de urgență în sănătate publică? Dacă da, au fost solicitanții de azil/altor forme de protecție internațională asigurați, cu produse de igienă, acces la infrastructură sanitară și apă, informații cu privire la procedurile și măsurile de precauție legate de COVID-19/AAP?			
V.I	<b>GESTIONAREA DEȘEURILOR</b>			
6.1	Există la PTF spații/recipiente/saci, special dedicate deșeurilor rezultate în urma activităților aferente măsurilor privind COVID-19/AAP (măști, mănuși, șervețele uzate etc.)? Precizați.			
6.2	Există la PTF reglementări/POS/protocoale dedicate pentru gestionarea (colectarea, tratarea, transportarea, depozitarea) deșeurilor rezultate în urma activităților aferente măsurilor privind COVID-19/AAP (măști, mănuși, șervețele uzate, recipiente diverse etc.)?			
6.3	Există la PTF reglementări/POS/protocoale dedicate pentru gestionarea (colectarea, tratarea, transportarea, depozitarea) deșeurilor rezultate în urma activităților aferente măsurilor privind COVID-19/AAP (măști, mănuși, șervețele uzate, recipiente diverse etc.), în mod ad-hoc, la necesitate, imediat în timpul/după confruntarea cu un caz probabil de infectare cu COVID-19/AAP?			

V.I.I	<b>PROCEDURI OPERAȚIONALE STANDARD (POS), REGLEMENTĂRI (PROTOCOALE)/INSTRUCȚIUNI/NORME APLICABILE ÎN PTF</b>			
7.1	Există POS, aplicabile în PTF, privind prevenirea transmiterii/contaminării cu agenți patogeni cu risc ridicat de epidemie/pandemie și gestionarea crizelor aferente la frontiera de stat (măsuri de igienă personală <spălatul corect al mâinilor, igiena locului de muncă, utilizarea mijloacelor de protecție, folosirea substanțelor dezinfectante>, sanitar-epidemiologice, izolare, de cooperare cu alte instituții relevante din domeniul de sănătate publică, inclusiv cu roluri în domeniul Managementului Integrat al Frontierei de Stat)? Au fost POS consultate cu Ministerul Sănătății? Care sunt PSO aplicabile?			
7.2	Există POS, aplicabile în PTF, elaborate/adaptate la măsurile de prevenire a transmiterii/contaminării cu COVID-19 și măsuri de intervenție aferente la frontiera de stat (igienă personală <spălatul corect al mâinilor, igiena locului de muncă, purtarea mijloacelor de protecție, folosirea substanțelor dezinfectante>, sanitar-epidemiologice, identificarea, gestionarea cazurilor suspecte de infectare cu COVID-19/AAP, izolare, carantină, cooperare cu alte instituții relevante din domeniul de sănătate publică, inclusiv cu roluri în domeniul Managementului Integrat al Frontierei de Stat, precum și cu transportatorii, în vederea atenționării pasagerilor cu referire la cazurile suspecte)? Au fost PSO consultate cu Ministerul Sănătății? Care sunt PSO aplicabile?			
7.3	Există reglementări (protocoale) aplicabile la PTF privind transportarea persoanelor care traversează frontiera de stat suspecte de infectare cu COVID-19/AAP la instituțiile medicale stabilite, inclusiv (dacă e cazul) lista instituțiilor medicale/spitale unde urmează să fie transportate persoanele respective pentru testare/îngrijire medicală ?			
7.4	Există reglementări (protocoale) aplicabile la PTF privind stabilirea circuitelor personalului PTF ce intră în contact cu persoanele care traversează frontiera de stat, separate de circuitele celuilalt personal din PTF ? Care sunt acestea?			
7.5	Există reglementări (protocoale) aplicabile la PTF privind utilizarea de către polițiștii de frontieră a echipamentului de protecție (măști, combinezoane, mănuși, viziere)? Care sunt acestea?			
7.6	Există reglementări (protocoale) aplicabile la PTF cu privire la utilizarea și specificațiile ce țin de produsele de cărățare și dezinfectare a spațiilor de lucru în PTF?			

7.7	Există POS comune aplicabile la PTF pentru cooperare în vederea gestionării situațiilor de criză de sănătate publică, în comun cu alte autorități de nivel central și local, inclusiv cu roluri în domeniul Managementul Integrat al Frontierei de Stat:			
a	Ministerul Sănătății			
b	Serviciul Vamal			
c	APL			
d	Alte autorități publice			



**Technical specifications for the recommended equipment**

No	Model of recommended equipment	Technical Specifications	Cost per unit	Source
<i>Detection and communication equipment</i>				
1.	Handheld IR Thermography Camera	HIKVISION DS-2TP31-3AUF - Operating temperature range from - 10 °C to 50 °C from - Thermometry range of -20° C to +550 ° C - Accuracy of reading of +/- 2 °C - Minimum focalization distance. – 150 mm	1000 USD	<a href="https://www.spy-shop.ro/camera-cu-termoviziune-hikvision-ds-2tp31b-3auf-precizie-0-5-grade.html">https://www.spy-shop.ro/camera-cu-termoviziune-hikvision-ds-2tp31b-3auf-precizie-0-5-grade.html</a>
2.	Professional Thermal Camera, FLIR T540 MSX	- Measured distance - 0.05 – 40 m +/-1 % - Thermal sensitivity - 40mK NETD/0.05°C - Extended thermometry range of - 20°C to 1500°C - Accuracy of +/-2 °C or +/-2 % of reading - Operating temperature range of – 15 °C to + 50°C - Digital zoom - 1-6x;	14995 USD	<a href="https://www.micronix.ro/ro/produse/furnizor_Camera-termoviziune-profesionala_FLIR-Systems_FLIR-T540-MSX_Camere-termale-si-Accesorii-3161">https://www.micronix.ro/ro/produse/furnizor_Camera-termoviziune-profesionala_FLIR-Systems_FLIR-T540-MSX_Camere-termale-si-Accesorii-3161</a> <a href="https://www.flir.com/products/t540/">https://www.flir.com/products/t540/</a>
3.	PC Dell Optiplex 5060 Small Form Factor	- Processor - Intel Core i3 8 Gen 3.60GHz - RAM – 8 Gb - SSD – Toshiba KSG60ZMV M.2 2280, 256G - Monitor – Dell P 2319H - Mouse, Keyboard – Dell	969 USD	

4.	TV screen, LED 43" Smart LG 43LK5910PLC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Display 43"</li> <li>- HDR 10</li> <li>- Resolution 1920x1080 FullHD</li> <li>- Image - 16:9</li> <li>- Operating system – webOS</li> <li>- Connection – USB entry, 2 HDMI entries, Ethernet (LAN), Wi-F</li> </ul>	355 USD	
<i>Isolation equipment</i>				
3.	Isolation Tent (small)	5m length x 3m width x 3m height Floor: 0.9mm thickness, two entries with zip and section for unclothing		<a href="http://www.meigora.ro/produs/cort-gonflabil-medical/">http://www.meigora.ro/produs/cort-gonflabil-medical/</a>
4.	Triage Tent (big)	5m length x 4m width x 3m height Floor: 0.9mm thickness, two entries with zip and section for unclothing		
5.	Medical bed, Model КРП	1900cm length x 580 cm width x 530cm height	131 USD	<a href="https://www.gbg.md/ro/">https://www.gbg.md/ro/</a>
6.	Medical cabinet, Model ШМ – 1С	500 cm length x 400 width x 1620 cm height	276 USD	
7.	Chair	Metal chair	17 USD	<a href="https://bigshop.md/ro/product/scaun-nowy-styl-seven-black-p108213">https://bigshop.md/ro/product/scaun-nowy-styl-seven-black-p108213</a>

8.	LED Lights for the isolation tents, ELMOS HLHB002, including chain and hanger	Power – 100 W Voltage – 220 – 240 V	61 USD	<a href="https://volta.md/produs/corp-de-iluminat-led-elmos-hlhb002-100-w/">https://volta.md/produs/corp-de-iluminat-led-elmos-hlhb002-100-w/</a>
10.	LED Lights for the triage tents, ELMOS HLHB002, including chain and hanger	Power – 150 W Voltage – 220 – 240 V	74 USD	<a href="https://volta.md/produs/corp-de-iluminat-led-elmos-hlhb002-150-w/">https://volta.md/produs/corp-de-iluminat-led-elmos-hlhb002-150-w/</a>
11.	Multi – outlet surge protected power strip, ORNO MULTISWITCH	6 outlets, 16A, electrical line conditioners LC	20 USD	<a href="https://volta.md/produs/prelungitor-orno-multiswitch-16-a-6-locuri/">https://volta.md/produs/prelungitor-orno-multiswitch-16-a-6-locuri/</a>
12.	Hot Air Generator	Timberk TIH R5 3M	83 USD	<a href="https://maximum.md/ro/5841069/">https://maximum.md/ro/5841069/</a>
<i>Disinfection equipment</i>				
13.	DeltaSystech UV-C flow germicidal lamp AS-055 – ST model	- Mobile - 2 UV-C – internal tubes of 55 - Disinfecting area of 50 - 150 m <sup>2</sup>	679 USD	
14.	ULV Generator Bure extensive space mobile electrical nebulizer	- Disinfecting area of up to 100 m <sup>2</sup> - Power of diffusing particles of 10-50 microns	562 USD	<a href="https://www.pestcontrol-expert.ro/smbure-bure.html">https://www.pestcontrol-expert.ro/smbure-bure.html</a>
15.	Mini Safe Step Carpets	- 950x700x45/645x440 - Disinfectant absorption capacity - 2.5 L	70 USD	
16.	Automatic/non-touch hand sanitizer dispensers, Purell Automatic Hand Sanitizer Dispenser	Electronic, Non – touch Capacity – 1.2L	47 USD	<a href="https://ecurat.md/shop/dozatoare-si-dispensere/sisteme-de-dozare-automata/dozator-automat-pentru-lichid-600-ml.html">https://ecurat.md/shop/dozatoare-si-dispensere/sisteme-de-dozare-automata/dozator-automat-pentru-lichid-600-ml.html</a>
17.	Floor stand with automatic/non-touch hand sanitizer dispenser already included, inox	Mechanical, non-touch	92 USD	<a href="https://ecurat.md/shop/protectia-si-igiena-muncii/sisteme-de-dozare-dezinfectanti/suport-sistem-de-dozare-lichide.html">https://ecurat.md/shop/protectia-si-igiena-muncii/sisteme-de-dozare-dezinfectanti/suport-sistem-de-dozare-lichide.html</a>
<i>Equipment for waste management</i>				

18.	Containers for collection of biohazardous waste and stickers with the pictogram "Biohazard"	Dimensions: 51cm x 40cm x 79,5cm Capacity - 80 L	34 USD	<a href="https://salubritate.md/ro/produs/pubele-p-u-transporta-deseurile-cu-pedala-80l/">https://salubritate.md/ro/produs/pubele-p-u-transporta-deseurile-cu-pedala-80l/</a>
19.	Yellow bags labeled with the pictogram "Biohazard"	Dimensions: 500x1000mm Thickness - 50-70 µ Capacity -80 L	0,25 USD	<a href="https://alphabrio.ro/ro/magazin/recipiente-pentru-deseuri-medicale/saci-pentru-deseuri-periculoasenepericuloase/saci-polietilenaptr-deseuti-infectioase-pericol-biologic-80l/">https://alphabrio.ro/ro/magazin/recipiente-pentru-deseuri-medicale/saci-pentru-deseuri-periculoasenepericuloase/saci-polietilenaptr-deseuti-infectioase-pericol-biologic-80l/</a>
20.	Regular waste bins	10 L	11 USD	

### ***Reports on the situation at each BCP***

#### **Leușeni-Albița BCP**

Leușeni-Albița BCP is a road BCP, with international status, located at the Romanian – Moldovan Border. It is the BCP with the largest flow of travellers.

#### ***Detection process and available equipment***

The entry and exit screening of travellers on regular routes (buses and minibuses) is carried out inside two large border control halls, available on the entry and on the exit directions, including the thermometry and the filling of the epidemiological fiches (carried out only on the entry direction), before the border control procedure. The screening of drivers and passengers of personal vehicles and of lorries is carried out outside, just before the border control booths.

For carrying out the epidemiological screening, the Leușeni-Albița BCP is equipped with 6 (six) simple digital infrared thermometers that require maintaining a measurement distance of 3 – 15 cm from the traveller, therefore it does not allow maintaining a distance of at least 1 m from him/her. These thermometers also require an operating temperature range from + 15 °C to + 25° C for proper functioning. Consequently, they have a low accuracy of reading, when used below or above these temperatures and often even when the recommended operating temperature range is respected. Because of the low accuracy of the thermometry data provided by these thermometers, there were situations when the emergency medical care service was called in vain.

Additionally, a FLIR T 365 Thermal Imaging Camera, borrowed from the “Timofei Moșneaga” Republican Clinical Hospital, is temporarily available at the BCP, allowing for maintaining more than 1.5 m from the travellers, and at the same time ensuring the fluidity of travellers' flow. Given that the Leușeni - Albița BCP is the BCP with the highest flow of travellers, the available equipment is not enough to cover the BCP's needs for epidemiological screening, therefore, additional, more professional equipment ensuring a higher accuracy of the reading of data, is needed for both the screening of travellers on regular routes, as well as of the drivers and passengers of personal vehicles and lorries.

Once an ill traveller is detected at the BCP, as a result of the screening procedure, the 112 unified national service is notified, and it takes about 20 minutes for the emergency medical care service to arrive.

#### ***Disinfection procedures and available equipment***

Given that Customs Service, under the Ministry of Finance, is the owner of road BCPs' buildings and premises, it is this institution's responsibility to maintain a clean environment in the BCPs, for the border crossing personnel and travellers, and subsequently to clean and disinfect all the working and public spaces at the BCP, in

compliance with WHO sanitation and hygiene recommendations. Therefore, the BP does not have any cleaning or disinfection equipment, except for a 3L portable sprayer that is used to disinfect the working surfaces in the border control booth and working offices, with disinfecting solution (0.5% sodium hypochlorite solution). This sprayer is not efficient for disinfection of larger surfaces that needs to be done as part of the ad-hoc disinfection procedure after handling a case with suspected COVID – 19 infection. Therefore, additional disinfection equipment is needed, such as for example a bigger portable sprayer for disinfecting surfaces. Although the BP requires in its newly developed SOP on combating the transmission of COVID – 19 pandemic at BCPs, to carry out air sterilization in the screening and isolation rooms with UV- C lamps, the BCP is not equipped with such lamps.

The border control halls are equipped with two regular hand sanitizer dispensers, however these are not very visible and not enough to cover the needs of neither the border crossing staff, nor of the persons crossing the border, given the high flow of travellers passing through the BCP. Additional non – touch hand sanitizer dispensers are needed both for the use of the public, to be installed in the border control halls, as well as of the border crossing staff, to be installed in the border control booths.

#### *Isolation facilities and infrastructure*

The BCP has 1 isolation room, of approximately 7m<sup>2</sup>, equipped with a bed, a table and a chair. A pair of toilets (for men/women) with access to technical water, that before the pandemic had been used by the border crossing personnel, was allotted to this isolation room. Unfortunately, this room is not enough for hosting a bigger number of persons with suspected COVID – 19 infection, therefore 1 (one) tent for the potential isolation of a bigger number of persons would be needed. The room does not have access to drinking water.

#### *Other facilities*

A room dedicated for asylum seekers, of 12 m<sup>2</sup>, equipped with 4 beds, separate access to a toilet and technical water, table, chairs and a closet is also available in case of requests for asylum/other forms of protection. This room could be temporarily used for the temporary isolation of travellers with suspected COVID – 19 infection, in the event the room is available and not occupied by asylum seekers.

#### *Sanitary facilities and infrastructure (including access to drinking and technical water)*

The BCP has on its premises enough toilets for both the general public and the staff, i.e. in total 13 (thirteen) toilets. Of these: 9 (nine) are designated for the public (on both the entry/exit direction), that also include a mother and child room and 1 toilet for the people with disabilities (on the exit direction). Other 4 (four) toilets are designated only for the use of the crossing personnel and are located in the border control halls. As mentioned above, 2 (two) of these other toilets designated for the staff have been temporarily designated for the isolation room. The BP officers have access to drinking water at the BCP.

#### *Waste management*

The BCP is equipped with 4 plastic waste bins, that are not marked with the symbols for infectious waste and with no pedal. The bags with the bio waste from these trash bins are being collected, transported and disposed of by the "Ecostat LTD" waste management company with which the General Inspectorate of Border Police has a contract. Also, the waste bins are not equipped with special trash bags for infectious waste (yellow and marked with the pictogram "Biohazard").

### *Training*

Throughout February – March 2020, the capacity of the BCP staff to respond to the COVID – 19 public health crisis has been strengthened through a series of trainings organized by the Medical Centre of GIBP.

***For the available and recommended equipment for this BCP, please see Annex 1.***

## **Chişinău International Airport Border Police Sector (BPS)**

Chişinău International Airport BPS has the second largest flow of travelers of all BCPs. The BCP is part of two of Moldova's transiting corridors, i.e. Chişinău International Airport BCP – Leuşeni Albiţa BCP and Chişinău International Airport BCP – Tudora – Starokazacie transiting corridors.

### *Detection process and available equipment*

The entry and exit screening is carried out inside airport entry halls, available on the entry and on the exit directions, including the thermometry and the filling of the epidemiological fiches (carried out only on the entry direction), before the border control procedure.

For carrying out the epidemiological screening the BPS is equipped with 11 simple digital infrared thermometers that require maintaining a measurement distance of 3 – 15 cm from the traveller, therefore it does not allow maintaining a distance of at least 1 m from him/her. These thermometers also require an operating temperature range from + 15 °C to + 25° C for proper functioning. Consequently, they have a low accuracy of reading, when used below or above these temperatures and often even when the recommended operating temperature range is respected.

Additionally, 4 Thermal Imaging Cameras, made available at the BCP, by "Avia – Invest LTD" company (i.e. FLIR T 530 and Hikvision, DS-2TD 2617b – 6PA models), allowing for maintaining up to 40 m distance from the travellers, and at the same time ensuring the fluidity of travellers' flow.

Once an ill traveller is detected at the BCP, as a result of the screening procedure, the 112 unified national service is notified, and it takes about 10-15 minutes for the emergency medical care service to arrive.

#### *Disinfection procedures and available equipment*

Given that the building and the premises of the International Chişinău Airport BPS are administrated, under the concession agreement, with the Government of the Republic of Moldova, it is this institution's responsibility to maintain a clean environment in the BCPs, for the border crossing personnel and travellers, and subsequently to clean and disinfect all the working and public spaces at the BCP, in compliance with WHO sanitation and hygiene recommendations. Therefore, the BP does not have any cleaning or disinfection equipment, except for a 2L portable sprayer that is used to disinfect the working surfaces in the border control booth and working offices, with disinfecting solution (0.5% sodium hypochlorite solution). This sprayer is not efficient for disinfection of larger surfaces that needs to be done as part of the ad-hoc disinfection procedure after handling a case with suspected COVID – 19 infection. Therefore, additional disinfection equipment is needed, such as for example a bigger portable sprayer for disinfecting surfaces. Although the BP requires in its newly developed SOP on combating the transmission of COVID – 19 pandemic at BCPs, to carry out air sterilization in the screening and isolation rooms with UV- C lamps, the BCP is not equipped with such lamps.

The border control halls are equipped with four regular hand sanitizer dispensers, however these are not enough to cover the needs of neither the border crossing staff, nor of the persons crossing the border, given the high flow of travellers passing through the BCP. Additional non – touch hand sanitizer dispensers are needed for the use of the public and border crossing personnel, to be installed in the border control halls.

#### *Isolation facilities and infrastructure*

International Chişinău Airport has the only fully equipped isolation room. The isolation room has approximately 8-10 m<sup>2</sup> and is equipped with a small couch, a table and a chair, as well as separate toilet, with access to technical water. Unfortunately, this room is not enough for hosting a larger number of persons with suspected COVID – 19 infection, therefore, in the event of a larger number of people that would need to be temporarily isolated, it is recommended that "Avia – Invest LTD" company allots an additional isolation room. The room does not have access to drinking water.

Besides that, International Chişinău Airport has a 24-hour emergency medical unit, mobile medical supply vehicles and full-time onsite ambulance, as well as qualified medical staff (a doctor and a medical assistant).

#### *Other facilities*



Two dedicated rooms for asylum seekers, for men and women, with separate access to a toilet and technical water, are also available in case of requests for asylum/other forms of protection. These rooms could be temporarily used for the temporary isolation of travellers with suspected COVID – 19 infection, in the event they are available and not occupied by asylum seekers.

*Sanitary facilities and infrastructure (including access to drinking and technical water)*

The BPS has on its premises enough toilets for both the general public and the staff, i.e. in total 14 toilets, Of them: 12 have been designated for the public, including 2 for the persons with disabilities and a mother and child room (on the exit direction). Other 2 other toilets have been designated for the border crossing staff (In the VIP section). It is recommended that toilets are designated for the staff also in the regular airport's public spaces for the border crossing personnel during pandemics, to protect them for the possibility of getting infected. The BP officers have access to drinking water at the BCP.

*Waste management*

The BCP is not equipped with any waste bins dedicated for infectious waste from used PPE or from cases of contamination with COVID – 19 infection. The bags with this kind of waste is picked up by the border police officers at the Border BPS where it is collected in a special container, and then collected, transported and disposed of by "EcoStat LTD" waste management company with which the General Inspectorate of Border Police has a contract. Also, the waste bins are not equipped with special trash bags for biohazardous waste (yellow and marked with the pictogram "Biohazard").

*Training*

Throughout February – March 2020, the capacity of the BCP staff to respond to the COVID – 19 public health crisis has been strengthened through two trainings organized by the Medical Centre of GIBP, as well as the National Public Health Agency.

***For the available and recommended equipment for this BCP, please see Annex 1.***

**Sculeni - Sculeni BCP**

Sculeni-Sculeni BCP is a road BCP, with international status, located at the Romanian – Moldovan Border. It is the BCP with the third largest flow of travellers.

### *Detection process and available equipment*

The entry screening is carried out in a border control hall, available on the entry direction. The screening includes the thermometry and the filling of the epidemiological fiches (carried out only on the entry direction), before the border control procedure. The exist screening is now carried out outside, just before the border control booths. For the exit screening procedure, an additional triage tent would be needed to be installed during the cold or hot weather, which should be endowed with all the related equipment needed for the tent.

For carrying out the epidemiological screening, the Sculeni – Sculeni BCP is equipped with 4 (four) simple digital infrared thermometers that require maintaining a measurement distance of 3 – 15 cm from the traveller, therefore it does not allow maintaining a distance of at least 1 m from him/her. These thermometers also require an operating temperature range from + 15 °C to + 25° C for proper functioning. Consequently, they have a low accuracy of reading, when used below or above these temperatures and often even when the recommended operating temperature range is respected.

Once an ill traveller is detected at the BCP, as a result of the screening procedure, the 112 unified national service is notified, and it takes about 20 minutes for the emergency medical care service to arrive.

### *Disinfection procedures and available equipment*

Given that Customs Service, under the Ministry of Finance, is the owner of road BCPs' buildings and premises, it is this institution's responsibility to maintain a clean environment in the BCPs, for the border crossing personnel and travellers, and subsequently to clean and disinfect all the working and public spaces at the BCP, in compliance with WHO sanitation and hygiene recommendations. Therefore, the BP does not have any cleaning or disinfection equipment, except for a 2L portable sprayer that is used to disinfect the working surfaces in the border control booth and working offices, with disinfecting solution (0.5% sodium hypochlorite solution). This sprayer is not efficient for disinfection of larger surfaces that needs to be done as part of the ad-hoc disinfection procedure after handling a case with suspected COVID – 19 infection. Therefore, additional disinfection equipment is needed, such as for example a bigger portable sprayer for disinfecting surfaces. Although the BP requires in its newly developed SOP on combating the transmission of COVID – 19 pandemic at BCPs, to carry out air sterilization in the screening and isolation rooms with UV- C lamps, the BCP is not equipped with such lamps.

The BCP is not equipped with any hand sanitizer dispenser. Therefore, non – touch hand sanitizer dispensers are needed both for the use of the public, to be installed in the border control hall, as well as of the border crossing staff, to be installed in the border control booths.

### *Isolation facilities and infrastructure*

The BCP has 1 isolation room, of approximately 10m<sup>2</sup>, equipped with a bed, a table and chairs. The room does not have separate access to the toilet, neither to technical water. The room was taken from a working space and temporarily designated for the isolation of persons with suspected COVID – 19 infection and is part

of a corridor with several working spaces of the Customs Service. Therefore, a separate isolation tent would be needed to ensure that there is a permanent space for isolation, that is away from the BCP working spaces. The respective room does not have access to drinking water either.

#### *Other facilities*

There is no room dedicated for asylum seekers at the BCP. The respective room is available at the Border Police Sector.

#### *Sanitary facilities and infrastructure (including access to drinking and technical water)*

The BCP has on its premises only one pair of toilets (for women/men), which offers the only access to technical water, and no separate toilet for the BP border crossing personnel, unlike the Customs Service staff present at the BCP. It is important that the border police officers are also given access to the separate sanitary facilities of the Customs Service, especially during pandemics in order to protect them from getting infected. The BP officers have access to drinking water at the BCP.

#### *Waste management*

The BCP is equipped with 3 plastic waste bins, not marked with the specific symbols for infectious waste and with no pedal. The bags with the biohazardous waste from these trash bins are being collected, transported and disposed of by the "EcoStat LTD" waste management company with which the General Inspectorate of Border Police has a contract. Also, the waste bins are not equipped with special trash bags for infectious waste (yellow and marked with the pictogram "Biohazard").

#### *Training*

Throughout February – March 2020, the capacity of the BCP staff to respond to the COVID – 19 public health crisis has been strengthened through a series of trainings organized by the Medical Centre of GIBP.

***For the available and recommended equipment for this BCP, please see Annex 1.***

### **Palanca – Maiaki – Udobnoe Joint BCP**

Palanca – Maiaki – Udobnoe is a joint road BCP, with international status, located at the Moldovan-Ukrainian Border.

### *Detection process and available equipment*

The entry and exits screening are planned to be carried out the large border control hall, available for both the entry and exit directions. The screening includes the thermometry and the filling of the epidemiological fiches (carried out only on the entry direction), before the border control procedure. Given that it is a big BCP, with a large flow of travellers, especially during the holiday season, a triage tent would be needed to be installed during the cold or hot weather, in the event of a larger flow of persons arriving at the BCP. This should also be endowed with all the related equipment needed for the tent.

For carrying out the epidemiological screening, the BCP is equipped with 4 simple digital infrared thermometers that require maintaining a measurement distance of 3 – 15 cm from the traveller, therefore it does not allow maintaining a distance of at least 1 m from him/her. These thermometers also require an operating temperature range from + 15 °C to + 25° C for proper functioning. Consequently, they have a low accuracy of reading, when used below or above these temperatures and often even when the recommended operating temperature range is respected.

### *Disinfection procedures and available equipment*

Given that Customs Service, under the Ministry of Finance, is the owner of road BCPs' buildings and premises, it is this institution's responsibility to maintain a clean environment in the BCPs, for the border crossing personnel and travellers, and subsequently to clean and disinfect all the working and public spaces at the BCP, in compliance with WHO sanitation and hygiene recommendations. Therefore, the BP does not have any cleaning or disinfection equipment, except for a 2L portable sprayer that is used to disinfect the working surfaces in the border control booth and working offices, with disinfecting solution (0.5% sodium hypochlorite solution). This sprayer is not efficient for disinfection of larger surfaces that needs to be done as part of the ad-hoc disinfection procedure after handling a case with suspected COVID – 19 infection. Therefore, additional disinfection equipment is needed, such as for example a bigger portable sprayer for disinfecting surfaces. Although the BP requires in its newly developed SOP on combating the transmission of COVID – 19 pandemic at BCPs, to carry out air sterilization in the screening and isolation rooms with UV- C lamps, the BCP is not equipped with such lamps.

The BCP is not equipped with any hand sanitizer dispenser. Therefore, non – touch hand sanitizer dispensers are needed both for the use of the public, to be installed in the border control hall, as well as of the border crossing staff, to be installed in the border control booths.

### *Isolation facilities and infrastructure*

The BCP has 2 (two) available isolation rooms, 1 isolation room of 10 – 11m<sup>2</sup>, furnished with a table and a night table, on the entry direction, and another one of 10 – 11m<sup>2</sup>, unfurnished, on the exit direction. Both isolation rooms have been allotted separate toilets with access to technical water, which are situated nearby the rooms. The rooms do not have access to drinking water.

### *Other facilities*

There are also 2 (two) dedicated rooms for asylum seekers at the BCP, one for men, of approximately 30m<sup>2</sup> and another one for women, of 20m<sup>2</sup>.

*Sanitary facilities and infrastructure (including access to drinking and technical water)*

The BCP has on its premises 17 toilets in total. 7 toilets, including 6 for women/men, and another one for the persons with disabilities, are designated for the public. Other 10 are designated for the border crossing personnel present at the BCP. However, there is no mother and child section on the premises of the BCP. The BP officers have access to drinking water at the BCP.

*Waste management*

The BCP is equipped with 1 regular waste bins, not marked with the specific symbols for infectious waste and with no pedal. The bags with the biohazardous waste from this trash bin are being collected, transported and disposed of by Ștefan - Vodă rayon hospital of with which the General Inspectorate of Border Police has an agreement. Also, the waste bin is not equipped with special trash bags for infectious waste (yellow and marked with the pictogram "Biohazard").

*Training*

Throughout February – March 2020, the capacity of the BCP staff to respond to the COVID – 19 public health crisis has been strengthened through a series of trainings organized by the Medical Centre of GIBP.

***For the available and recommended equipment for this BCP, please see Annex 1.***

**Giurgiulești - Galați BCP**

Giurgiulești - Galați is a road BCP, with international status, located at the Moldovan - Romanian Border, and it also part of one of Moldova's transiting corridors, i.e. Giurgiulești - Galați BCP- Giurgiulești-Reni transiting corridor.

*Detection process and available equipment*

The entry and exits screening are carried out outside, at the BCP entry, before entering the premises of the BCP. The screening includes the thermometry and the filling of the epidemiological fiches (carried out only on the entry direction), before the border control procedure. Given the absence of border control halls that

would be able to fit many travellers during the hot or cold weather, a big triage tent would be needed to be installed on the premises of the BCP, during the cold or hot weather, which should be endowed with all the related equipment needed for the tent.

For carrying out the epidemiological screening, the BCP is equipped with 3 simple digital infrared thermometers that require maintaining a measurement distance of 3 – 15 cm from the traveller, therefore it does not allow maintaining a distance of at least 1 m from him/her. These thermometers also require an operating temperature range from + 15 °C to + 25° C for proper functioning. Consequently, they have a low accuracy of reading, when used below or above these temperatures and often even when the recommended operating temperature range is respected.

Once an ill traveller is detected at the BCP, as a result of the screening procedure, the 112 unified national service is notified, and it takes about 30-40 minutes for the emergency medical care service to arrive.

#### *Disinfection procedures and available equipment*

Given that Customs Service, under the Ministry of Finance, is the owner of road BCPs' buildings and premises, it is this institution's responsibility to maintain a clean environment in the BCPs, for the border crossing personnel and travellers, and subsequently to clean and disinfect all the working and public spaces at the BCP, in compliance with WHO sanitation and hygiene recommendations. Therefore, the BP does not have any cleaning or disinfection equipment, except for a 2L portable sprayer that is used to disinfect the working surfaces in the border control booth and working offices, with disinfecting solution (0.5% sodium hypochlorite solution). This sprayer is not efficient for disinfection of larger surfaces that needs to be done as part of the ad-hoc disinfection procedure after handling a case with suspected COVID – 19 infection. Therefore, additional disinfection equipment is needed, such as for example a bigger portable sprayer for disinfecting surfaces. Although the BP requires in its newly developed SOP on combating the transmission of COVID – 19 pandemic at BCPs, to carry out air sterilization in the screening and isolation rooms with UV- C lamps, the BCP is not equipped with such lamps.

The BCP is equipped with 5 (five) hand sanitizer dispensers dedicated for the border police officers. However, non – touch hand sanitizer dispensers are also needed for the use of the public, to be placed outside the BCP building.

#### *Isolation facilities and infrastructure*

The BCP has one isolation room of approximately 14 m<sup>2</sup>, furnished with a table, chairs and closet. The isolation room does not have separate access to a toilet and technical water. However, one could be designated temporarily for the suspected case, if needed, from the toilets available for the staff in the same building. The room does not have access to drinking water either.

#### *Other facilities*

There is one dedicated room for asylum seekers at the BCP, of approximately 16m<sup>2</sup>.

*Sanitary facilities and infrastructure (including access to drinking and technical water)*

The BCP has on its premises 3 (three) public toilets, i.e. 2 (two) for men and women, which also include a mother and child room, and a toilet for the persons with disabilities. Another separate toilet is available for the BP border crossing personnel. The BP officers have access to drinking water at the BCP.

*Waste management*

The BCP is equipped with 1 (one) regular waste bins, not marked with the specific symbols for infectious waste and with no pedal. The bags with the biohazardous waste from this trash bin are being collected, transported and disposed of by the "Ecostat LTD" waste management company with which the General Inspectorate of Border Police has a contract. Also, the waste bin is not equipped with special trash bags for infectious waste (yellow and marked with the pictogram "Biohazard").

*Training*

Throughout February – March 2020, the capacity of the BCP staff to respond to the COVID – 19 public health crisis has been strengthened through a series of trainings organized by the Medical Centre of GIBP.

***For the available and recommended equipment for this BCP, please see Annex 1.***

**Galați - Reni BCP**

Galați - Reni BCP is a joint road BCP, with international status, located at the Moldovan-Ukrainian Border. It serves for the control of persons and vehicles only on the entry direction, while the control on the exit direction only is carried out on the premises of the Galați - Reni joint road BCP, situated on the Ukrainian side. The BCP is also part of one of Moldova's transiting corridors, i.e. Giurgiulești - Galați BCP- Giurgiulești-Reni BCP transiting corridor.

*Detection process and available equipment*

The entry screening is carried outside, before the border control booth and includes the thermometry and the filling of the epidemiological fiches, before the border control procedure. Therefore, it is recommended that the BCP is equipped with a tent for carrying out the screening of persons during the cold or hot weather. This should be endowed with all the related equipment needed for the tent.

For carrying out the epidemiological screening, the Galați - Reni BCP is equipped with 1 (one) simple digital infrared thermometers that require maintaining a measurement distance of 3 – 15 cm from the traveller, therefore it does not allow maintaining a distance of at least 1 m from him/her. This thermometer also requires an operating temperature range from + 15 °C to + 25° C for proper functioning. Consequently, it has a low accuracy of reading, when used below or above these temperatures and often even when the recommended operating temperature range is respected.

Once an ill traveller is detected at the BCP, as a result of the screening procedure, the 112 unified national service is notified, and it takes about 30-40 minutes for the emergency medical care service to arrive.

#### *Disinfection procedures and available equipment*

Given that Customs Service, under the Ministry of Finance, is the owner of road BCPs' buildings and premises, it is this institution's responsibility to maintain a clean environment in the BCPs, for the border crossing personnel and travellers, and subsequently to clean and disinfect all the working and public spaces at the BCP, in compliance with WHO sanitation and hygiene recommendations. Therefore, the BP does not have any cleaning or disinfection equipment, except for a 2L portable sprayer that is used to disinfect the working surfaces in the border control booth and working offices, with disinfecting solution (0.5% sodium hypochlorite solution). This sprayer is not efficient for disinfection of larger surfaces that needs to be done as part of the ad-hoc disinfection procedure after handling a case with suspected COVID – 19 infection. Therefore, additional disinfection equipment is needed, such as for example a bigger portable sprayer for disinfecting surfaces. Although the BP requires in its newly developed SOP on combating the transmission of COVID – 19 pandemic at BCPs, to carry out air sterilization in the screening and isolation rooms with UV- C lamps, the BCP is not equipped with such lamps.

The office of the BP border crossing personnel is equipped with a regular hand sanitizer dispenser. No such hand sanitizer dispenser is available for the public. An additional non – touch hand sanitizer dispensers needs to be installed outside, for the use of the public.

#### *Isolation facilities and infrastructure*

The BCP has 1 (one) dedicated isolation room, of approximately 6m<sup>2</sup>, equipped with a table and two chairs. The room does not have access to a separate toilet, nor to drinking water.

#### *Other facilities*

The BCP is so small that it does not have a room for asylum seekers, however such a room, of approximately 16m<sup>2</sup>, is available at the Border Police Sector, which is located at a walking distance from the BCP.



*Sanitary facilities and infrastructure (including access to drinking and technical water)*

The BCP has on its premises only one biohazardous toilet which is used for both the general public and the staff. However, this toilet is not equipped with sanitary equipment, giving access to technical water, given that the BCP premises are constructed on a bridge. Therefore, the water is brought to the BCP in water tanks. A sink for the border crossing personnel only is, however, available in the BCP's kitchenette. It is recommended that the BCP is equipped with hand washing equipment, with access to technical water, for the public as well.

*Waste management*

The BCP is not equipped with any waste bins. The regular bags with the biohazardous waste are being picked up from the BCP by the staff of the BP sector and collected at the sector, where it is being collected, transported and disposed of by the "Ecostat LTD" waste management company with which the General Inspectorate of Border Police has a contract.

*Training*

Throughout February – March 2020, the capacity of the BCP staff to respond to the COVID – 19 public health crisis has been strengthened through a series of trainings organized by the Medical Centre of GIBP.

***For the available and recommended equipment for this BCP, please see Annex 1.***

**Cahul – Oancea BCP**

Cahul - Oancea BCP is road BCP, with international status, located at the Moldovan-Romanian Border.

*Detection process and available equipment*

The entry and exit screening is carried out outside, on the entry and on the exit directions, before the border control booths, since the BCP does not have border control halls. The screening procedure includes the thermometry and the filling of the epidemiological fiches, before the border control procedure. Therefore, it is recommended that the BCP is equipped with an additional triage tent.

For carrying out the epidemiological screening, the Cahul - Oancea BCP is equipped with 1 (one) simple digital infrared thermometers that requires maintaining a measurement distance of 3 – 15 cm from the traveller, therefore it does not allow maintaining a distance of at least 1 m from him/her. This thermometer also requires an operating temperature range from + 15 °C to + 25° C for proper functioning. Consequently, it has a low accuracy of reading, when used below or above these temperatures and often even when the recommended operating temperature range is respected.

Once an ill traveller is detected at the BCP, as a result of the screening procedure, the 112 unified national service is notified, and it takes about 30 minutes for the emergency medical care service to arrive.

#### *Disinfection procedures and available equipment*

Given that Customs Service, under the Ministry of Finance, is the owner of road BCPs' buildings and premises, it is this institution's responsibility to maintain a clean environment in the BCPs, for the border crossing personnel and travellers, and subsequently to clean and disinfect all the working and public spaces at the BCP, in compliance with WHO sanitation and hygiene recommendations. Therefore, the BP does not have any cleaning or disinfection equipment, except for 2L portable sprayers that are used to disinfect the working surfaces in the border control booths with disinfecting solution (0.5% sodium hypochlorite solution). Therefore, the BP does not have any cleaning or disinfection equipment, except for a 2L portable sprayer that is used to disinfect the working surfaces in the border control booth and working offices, with disinfecting (0.5% sodium hypochlorite solution). This sprayer is not efficient for disinfection of larger surfaces that needs to be done as part of the ad-hoc disinfection procedure after handling a case with suspected COVID – 19 infection. Therefore, additional disinfection equipment is needed, such as for example a bigger portable sprayer for disinfecting surfaces. Although the BP requires in its newly developed SOP on combating the transmission of COVID – 19 pandemic at BCPs, to carry out air sterilization in the screening and isolation rooms with UV- C lamps, the BCP is not equipped with such lamps.

The BP border control booths are equipped with 2 (two) regular hand sanitizer dispensers. Additional non – touch hand sanitizer dispensers need to be installed outside, for the use of the public.

#### *Isolation facilities and infrastructure*

A temporarily isolation room has been identified at the BCP, of approximately 12m<sup>2</sup>, equipped with a table, a chair and a closet. The room does not have access to a separate toilet, nor to drinking water. Given that the identified room was a working space dedicated for the regime patrol, in charge of monitoring the border crossing regime at the BCP, especially during the cold and rainy weather, 1 (one) isolation tent would need to be installed at the BCP, which should be endowed with all the related equipment needed for the tent.

#### *Other facilities*

The BCP does not have a room for asylum seekers, however such a room is available at the Border Police Sector, which is located not far from the BCP.

*Sanitary facilities and infrastructure (including access to drinking and technical water)*

The BCP has on its premises 3 (three) toilets, including by one for men and women and 1 (one) for the persons with disabilities, as well as one mother and child room. The toilets are used for both the general public and the border crossing staff and offer access to technical water. It is recommended that border police officers are given access to the separate sanitary facilities of the Customs Service, especially during pandemics in order to protect them from getting infected. The BP officers have access to drinking water at the BCP.

*Waste management*

The BCP is not equipped with any waste bins. The regular bags with the biohazardous waste is being picked up from the BCP by the staff of the BP sector and collected at the sector, where it is collected, transported and disposed of by the "EcoStat LTD" waste management company with which the General Inspectorate of Border Police has a contract.

*Training*

Throughout February – March 2020, the capacity of the BCP staff to respond to the COVID – 19 public health crisis has been strengthened through a series of trainings organized by the Medical Centre of GIBP.

***For the available and recommended equipment for this BCP, please see Annex 1.***

**Criva – Mamaliga BCP**

Criva - Mamaliga BCP is a joint road BCP, with international status, located at the Moldovan-Ukrainian Border. It serves for the control of persons and vehicles only on the entry direction, while the border control on the exit direction only is carried out on the Ukrainian side.

*Detection process and available equipment*

The entry screening, include the temperature measurement , which is carried out outside, at the BCP entry, before entering the premises of the BCP and the filling of the epidemiological fiches, which is carried out on the premises of the BCP, before the border control booth. Given that the BCP is designated for carrying out

the border/customs control procedures only on the entry direction, in order to ensure respect of public order and security at the BCP during crowded periods, it is recommended that the BCP is equipped with an additional triage tent.

For carrying out the epidemiological screening, the Criva - Mamaliga BCP is equipped with 6 (six) simple digital infrared thermometers that require maintaining a measurement distance of 3 – 15 cm from the traveler, therefore it does not allow maintaining a distance of at least 1 m from him/her. This thermometer also requires an operating temperature range from + 15 °C to + 25° C for proper functioning. Consequently, it has a low accuracy of reading, when used below or above these temperatures and often even when the recommended operating temperature range is respected.

#### *Disinfection procedures and available equipment*

Given that Customs Service, under the Ministry of Finance, is the owner of road BCPs' buildings and premises, it is this institution's responsibility to maintain a clean environment in the BCPs, for the border crossing personnel and travelers, and subsequently to clean and disinfect all the working and public spaces at the BCP, in compliance with WHO sanitation and hygiene recommendations. Therefore, the BP does not have any cleaning or disinfection equipment, except for 2L portable sprayers that are used to disinfect the working surfaces in the border control booths with disinfecting solution (0.5% sodium hypochlorite solution). Therefore, the BP does not have any cleaning or disinfection equipment, except for a 2L portable sprayer that is used to disinfect the working surfaces in the border control booth and working offices, with disinfecting (0.5% sodium hypochlorite solution). This sprayer is not efficient for disinfection of larger surfaces that needs to be done as part of the ad-hoc disinfection procedure after handling a case with suspected COVID – 19 infection. Therefore, additional disinfection equipment is needed, such as for example a bigger portable sprayer for disinfecting surfaces. Although the BP requires in its newly developed SOP on combating the transmission of COVID – 19 pandemic at BCPs, to carry out air sterilization in the screening and isolation rooms with UV- C lamps, the BCP is not equipped with such lamps.

Given the absence of any hand sanitizer dispensers at the BCP, it needs to be equipped with non – touch hand sanitizer dispensers, for the use of both the public and the border crossing personnel.

#### *Isolation facilities and infrastructure*

The BCP has designated large isolation room, of approximately 18m<sup>2</sup>, equipped with a table. The room has access to a separate toilet but is poorly equipped. The room does not have access to drinking water either.

There is also a separate zone dedicated to the quarantine of vehicles.

#### *Other facilities*

The BCP does not have a room for asylum seekers, however such a room is available at the Border Police Sector, which is located not far from the BCP.

*Sanitary facilities and infrastructure (including access to drinking and technical water)*

The BCP has on its premises a pair of public toilets (for men and women) and at least one toilet for the border crossing personnel. There are no sanitary facilities for persons with disabilities or a mother and child room at the BCP. However, the border crossing personnel has access to drinking water.

*Waste management*

The BCP is not equipped with any waste bins. Regular bags with the biohazardous waste are being picked up from the BCP by the staff of the BP sector and collected at the sector, where is being collected, transported and disposed of by the "Ecostat LTD" waste management company with which the General Inspectorate of Border Police has a contract.

*Training*

Throughout February – March 2020, the capacity of the BCP staff to respond to the COVID – 19 public health crisis has been strengthened through a series of trainings organized by the Medical Centre of GIBP.

***For the available and recommended equipment for this BCP, please see Annex 1.***

**Otaci-Moghilev-Podolsk BCP**

Otaci-Moghilev-Podolsk BCP is a road BCP, with international status, located at the Moldovan-Ukrainian Border, basically in the Otaci rayon, therefore is not suitable for being open during a public health emergency of international concern, linked to the spread of a pandemic.

*Detection process and available equipment*

The entry and exits screening, include the temperature measurement and the filling of the epidemiological fiches (only of the entry direction) and is carried out outside, on the premises of the BCP, before the border control booth.

For carrying out the epidemiological screening, the Criva - Mamaliga BCP is equipped with 7 (seven) simple digital infrared thermometers that require maintaining a measurement distance of 3 – 15 cm from the traveller, therefore it does not allow maintaining a distance of at least 1 m from him/her. This thermometer also requires an operating temperature range from + 15 °C to + 25° C for proper functioning. Consequently, it has a low accuracy of reading, when used below or above these temperatures and often even when the recommended operating temperature range is respected.

### *Disinfection procedures and available equipment*

Given that Customs Service, under the Ministry of Finance, is the owner of road BCPs' buildings and premises, it is this institution's responsibility to maintain a clean environment in the BCPs, for the border crossing personnel and travellers, and subsequently to clean and disinfect all the working and public spaces at the BCP, in compliance with WHO sanitation and hygiene recommendations. Therefore, the BP does not have any cleaning or disinfection equipment, except for a 2L portable sprayer that is used to disinfect the working surfaces in the border control booth and working offices, with disinfecting solution (0.5% sodium hypochlorite solution). This sprayer is not efficient for disinfection of larger surfaces that needs to be done as part of the ad-hoc disinfection procedure after handling a case with suspected COVID – 19 infection. Therefore, additional disinfection equipment is needed, such as for example a bigger portable sprayer for disinfecting surfaces. Although the BP requires in its newly developed SOP on combating the transmission of COVID – 19 pandemic at BCPs, to carry out air sterilization in the screening and isolation rooms with UV- C lamps, the BCP is not equipped with such lamps.

The BCP needs to be equipped with additional non – touch hand sanitizer dispensers, for the use of both the public and the border crossing personnel.

### *Isolation facilities and infrastructure*

The BCP does not have an isolation room, nor a spare room for the temporary isolation of suspected cases. The territory of the BCP is very small, and not possible to extend, given that it is surrounded by private property and a public road. On the premises of the BCP there is also a small separate zone dedicated to the quarantine of vehicles, where a small isolation tent could be installed, for the temporary isolation of persons with suspected COVID – 19 infection.

### *Other facilities*

The BCP does not have a room for asylum seekers, however such a room is available at the Border Police Sector, which is located not far from the BCP.

### *Sanitary facilities and infrastructure (including access to drinking and technical water)*

The only functional toilets nearby the BCP is a pair of toilets (for men/women) belonging to a brokering firm, that is used by the border crossing personnel and by the general public working or passing nearby. The toilets are not clean and in an unsatisfactory condition, therefore do not correspond to the sanitary measures that are recommended to be respected during the COVID – 19 outbreak.

The BCP has on its premises only a pair of newly built toilets (for men and women), which are not functional since they await official opening. It is recommended that these toilets are open as soon as possible, for both the public and the border crossing personnel.

The border crossing personnel has no access to drinking water either.

### *Waste management*

The BCP is not equipped with any waste bins. Regular bags with the biohazardous waste are being picked up from the BCP by the staff of the BP sector and collected at the sector, where it is collected, transported and disposed of by the "EcoStat LTD" waste management company with which the General Inspectorate of Border Police has a contract.

### *Training*

Throughout February – March 2020, the capacity of the BCP staff to respond to the COVID – 19 public health crisis has been strengthened through a series of trainings organized by the Medical Centre of GIBP.

***For the available and recommended equipment for this BCP, please see Annex 1.***

## **Tudora – Starokazacie BCP**

Tudora – Starokazacie BCP is a road BCP, with international status, located at the Romanian – Moldovan Border. It is also part of one of Moldova's transiting corridors, i.e. Chişinău International Airport – Tudora – Starokazacie transiting corridor.

### *Detection process and available equipment*

The entry and exit screening of travellers, includes the thermometry and the filling of the epidemiological fiches (carried out only on the entry direction) and is carried out outside, before the border control booths and carrying out the border control procedure. Therefore, it is recommended that the BCP is equipped with two triage tents for carrying out the entry and exit screening during the cold and hot weather. These should also be endowed with all the related equipment needed for the tents.

For carrying out the epidemiological screening, the Tudora - Starokazacie BCP is equipped with 4 simple digital infrared thermometers that require maintaining a measurement distance of 3 – 15 cm from the traveller, therefore it does not allow maintaining a distance of at least 1 m from him/her. These thermometers also require an operating temperature range from + 15 °C to + 25° C for proper functioning. Consequently, they have a low accuracy of reading, when used below or above these temperatures and often even when the recommended operating temperature range is respected.

Once an ill traveller is detected at the BCP, as a result of the screening procedure, the 112 unified national service is notified, and it takes about 20 minutes for the emergency medical care service to arrive.

### *Disinfection procedures and available equipment*

Given that Customs Service, under the Ministry of Finance, is the owner of road BCPs' buildings and premises, it is this institution's responsibility to maintain a clean environment in the BCPs, for the border crossing personnel and travellers, and subsequently to clean and disinfect all the working and public spaces at the BCP, in compliance with WHO sanitation and hygiene recommendations. Therefore, the BP does not have any cleaning or disinfection equipment, except for a 2L portable sprayer that are used to disinfect the working surfaces in the border control booth and working offices, with disinfecting solution (0.5% sodium hypochlorite solution). This sprayer is not efficient for disinfection of larger surfaces that needs to be done as part of the ad-hoc disinfection procedure after handling a case with suspected COVID – 19 infection. Therefore, additional disinfection equipment is needed, such as for example a bigger portable sprayer for disinfecting surfaces. Although the BP requires in its newly developed SOP on combating the transmission of COVID – 19 pandemic at BCPs, to carry out air sterilization in the screening and isolation rooms with UV- C lamps, the BCP is not equipped with such lamps.

Given the absence of any hand sanitizer dispensers at the BCP, it also needs to be equipped with non – touch hand sanitizer dispensers, for the use of both the public and the border crossing personnel.

#### *Isolation facilities and infrastructure*

The BCP has 1 (one) isolation room, of approximately 10m<sup>2</sup>, equipped with a bed, a table and a chair, with not access to a private toilet, but with access to a private sink with access to technical water. The room does not have access to drinking water.

#### *Other facilities*

The BCP does not have a room for asylum seekers, however such a room is available at the Border Police Sector, which is located not far from the BCP.

#### *Sanitary facilities and infrastructure (including access to drinking and technical water)*

The BCP has on its premises enough toilets for both the general public and the staff, i.e. in total 8 (six) toilets. Of these: 7 (six) are designated for the public, that also include a mother and child room and 2 toilets for the people with disabilities; and 1 (one) toilet is used by the border crossing personnel. The BP officers have also access to drinking water at the BCP.

#### *Waste management*

The BCP is equipped with 1 (one) plastic waste bin, which is not marked with the specific symbols for infectious waste and has no pedal. The contents of the waste bin are picked up by the staff of the BP sector, where it being collected, transported and disposed of by the "Ecostat LTD" waste management company with which the General Inspectorate of Border Police has a contract. Also, the waste bin is not equipped with special trash bags for infectious waste (yellow and marked with the pictogram "Biohazard").



### *Training*

Throughout February – March 2020, the capacity of the BCP staff to respond to the COVID – 19 public health crisis has been strengthened through a series of trainings organized by the Medical Centre of GIBP.

***For the available and recommended equipment for this BCP, please see Annex 1.***

### **Giurgiulești International Free Port BCP**

Giurgiulești International Free Port is a river BCP, with international status, located on the Lower Danube, which can receive both river-going and sea-going vessels, both for commercial, as well as touristic/passenger transportation purposes.

#### *Detection process and available equipment*

Currently there are no vessels of tourists and or passengers harbouring in the Port. However, the Port is prepared for carrying out the entry and exit screening of travellers in the available Port's border control hall, when the touristic vessels will be allowed to harbour in the Port. Currently, the border control procedure is carried out for the commercial vessels only, however without the descending of the crew on Moldovan soil. In some cases the border control personnel carries out the border control procedure for the crew of the vessels, by going on board the ship.

For carrying out the epidemiological screening, Giurgiulești International Free Port is equipped with 1 (one) simple digital infrared thermometers that require maintaining a measurement distance of 3 – 15 cm from the traveller, therefore it does not allow maintaining a distance of at least 1 m from him/her. These thermometers also require an operating temperature range from + 15 °C to + 25° C for proper functioning. Consequently, they have a low accuracy of reading, when used below or above these temperatures and often even when the recommended operating temperature range is respected.

#### *Disinfection procedures and available equipment*

The state company that administers the premises of Giurgiulești International Free Port is responsible for maintaining a clean environment in the Port, for the border crossing personnel and travellers, and subsequently to clean and disinfect all the working and public spaces at the BCP, in compliance with WHO sanitation and hygiene recommendations. Therefore, the BP does not have any cleaning or disinfection equipment, except for a 1,5 L portable sprayer that are used to disinfect the working surfaces in the border control booth and working offices, with disinfecting solution (0.5% sodium hypochlorite solution). This sprayer is not efficient

for disinfection of larger surfaces that needs to be done as part of the ad-hoc disinfection procedure after handling a case with suspected COVID – 19 infection. Therefore, additional disinfection equipment is needed, such as for example a bigger portable sprayer for disinfecting surfaces.

Two regular hand sanitizer dispensers are available in the working offices of the border crossing personnel. However, an additional non – touch hand sanitizer dispenser would be needed for the use of the public, to be installed in the Port's border control hall.

#### *Isolation facilities and infrastructure*

The BCP has 1 (one) isolation room, equipped with a bed, a table and chairs, without access to a separate toilet, and no access to drinking water. However, separate access could be offered in case of a suspected case of COVID – 19 infection, from the many toilets available in the Port.

#### *Other facilities*

A room dedicated for asylum seekers, of 12 m<sup>2</sup>, equipped with 4 beds, separate access to a toilet and technical water, table, chairs and a closet is also available in case of requests for asylum/other forms of protection. This room could be temporarily used for the temporary isolation of travelers with suspected COVID – 19 infection, in the event the room is available and not occupied by asylum seekers.

#### *Sanitary facilities and infrastructure (including access to drinking and technical water)*

The Port has on its premises, in total 6 (six) toilets. Of these, 2 (two), on the ground floor can be used by the public. The toilets do not include a mother and child room or a toilet for the people with disabilities. The BP officers do not have access to drinking water at the BCP.

#### *Waste management*

The BCP is equipped with 1 (one) plastic waste bin, which is not marked with the specific symbols for infectious waste and has no pedal. The contents of the waste bin are picked up by the staff of the BP sector, where it being collected, transported and disposed of by the "Ecostat LTD" waste management company with which the General Inspectorate of Border Police has a contract. Also, the waste bin is not equipped with special trash bags for infectious waste (yellow and marked with the pictogram "Biohazard").

#### *Training*

Throughout February – March 2020, the capacity of the BCP staff to respond to the COVID – 19 public health crisis has been strengthened through a series of trainings organized by the Medical Centre of GIBP.

***For the available and recommended equipment for this BCP, please see Annex 1.***

### **Ungheni – Iași BCP**

Ungheni - Iași BCP is a railway BCP, with international status, located at the Romanian – Moldovan Border.

#### *Detection process and available equipment*

Currently there are no passenger trains operating. However, the railway BCP is prepared for carrying out the entry and exit screening of travelers when the trains will be allowed to operate. The epidemiological screening of passengers is planned to take place in the wagons during the usual border control procedure, following the entry of the BP officers in the train. In some cases, the screening procedure could also take place in the BCP border control hall which is located in the railway station, for the passengers that get off the train in Ungheni or need to change the train. Thus, currently, only commercial trains pass by the BCP, the crew of which undergoes the epidemiological screening, following the BP officer's entry into the train.

For carrying out the epidemiological screening the BCP is equipped with 1 (one) simple digital infrared thermometers that require maintaining a measurement distance of 3 – 15 cm from the traveler, therefore it does not allow maintaining a distance of at least 1 m from him/her. These thermometers also require an operating temperature range from + 15 °C to + 25° C for proper functioning. Consequently, they have a low accuracy of reading, when used below or above these temperatures and often even when the recommended operating temperature range is respected.

#### *Disinfection procedures and available equipment*

"Moldovan Railways", the state company that administers the premises of the BCP, is responsible for maintaining a clean environment in the BCP, for the border crossing personnel and travelers, and subsequently to clean and disinfect all the working and public spaces at the BCP, in compliance with WHO sanitation and hygiene recommendations. Therefore, the BP does not have any cleaning or disinfection equipment, except for a 1.5L portable sprayer that are used to disinfect the working surfaces in the border control booth and working offices, with disinfecting solution (0.5% sodium hypochlorite solution). This sprayer is not efficient for disinfection of larger surfaces that needs to be done as part of the ad-hoc disinfection procedure after handling a case with suspected COVID – 19 infection. Therefore, additional disinfection equipment is needed, such as for example a bigger portable sprayer for disinfecting surfaces.

No hand sanitizer dispenser is available at the BCP. Therefore, 1 (one) non – touch hand sanitizer dispenser would be needed for the use of the public, to be installed in the railway station's border control hall.

#### *Isolation facilities and infrastructure*

The BCP has 1 (one) isolation room, equipped with a couch, a table and chairs, with access to a separate toilet, and no access to drinking water. The railway station has also a medical office, with the permanent presence of a doctor.

#### *Other facilities*

The BCP does not have a room for asylum seekers, however such a room is available at the Border Police Sector, which is located not far from the BCP.

#### *Sanitary facilities and infrastructure (including access to drinking and technical water)*

The Port has on its premise only a pair of public toilets (men/women), which are designated for both the use of the public and of the border crossing personnel. The toilets do not include a mother and child room or a toilet for the people with disabilities. The BP officers do not have access to drinking water at the BCP.

#### *Waste management*

The BCP is equipped with 1 (one) plastic waste bin, which is not marked with the specific symbols for infectious waste and has no pedal. The contents of the waste bin are picked up by the staff of the BP sector, where it being collected, transported and disposed of by the "Ecostat LTD" waste management company with which the General Inspectorate of Border Police has a contract. Also, the waste bin is not equipped with special trash bags for infectious waste (yellow and marked with the pictogram "Biohazard").

#### *Training*

Throughout February – March 2020, the capacity of the BCP staff to respond to the COVID – 19 public health crisis has been strengthened through a series of trainings organized by the Medical Centre of GIBP.

***For the available and recommended equipment for this BCP, please see Annex 1.***